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CHAPTER

I

This dissertation attempts to make a
contribution
to the project of giving an adequate
nominalistic account

of mathematical truth.

What should an account of mathe-

matical truth provide?

This is difficult to say.

sentences "say".

of course,

Roughly
speaking, the idea would be to specify what
mathematical

mum, however,

This,

is vague.

At the mini-

an account of mathematical truth should
give

a theory of truth for mathematical
sentences.

As here conceived,

the project of giving an adequate

nominalistic account of mathematical truth would
proceed as
follows
1)

An informal mathematical language^" a sentence belongs to is specified.

2)

A formal language is described.

3)

A translation procedure is described mapping
sentences of the informal language into sentences of the formal language.

Throughout this dissertation 'theory' and 'language'
will be used to mean 'interpreted theory' and
'interpreted'
language
respectively.
In speaking of uninterpreted theories or languages, I will make this explicit, often
using
the modifier 'uninterpreted'.
There will also be occasion
to speak of formal and informal theories and
languages.
A
ormal theory (language) will always be a theory (language)
cised on first order syntax for which
an interpretation is
explicitly provided.
An informal theory (language) will be
any other theory (language)
Thus we will speak of the informal theory 'there are numbers', the interpretation of
this theory beings imply its ordinary English
meaning, i.e.
its meaning in the informal language English.
,

.
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4)

It is argued that this translation procedure
gives adequate representations of the sentences
of the informal language.
(Of course, it will
be difficult to say what an adequate representation is.)

5)

'Nominalism'

6)

It is argued that the formal theories which are

is defined.

translations of informal theories are nominalistic.

The definition of truth would be:

sentence is

a

true if its translation is true in some formal language which

adequately represents some language to which that sentence
belongs.

Similarly, a sentence is false (neither true nor

false) if its translation is false (neither true nor false)
in some formal language which adequately represents some

language to which that sentence belongs.
In (1)

'sentence' means 'interpreted sentence'.

Only interpreted sentences "say" anything.

Thus it is only

interpreted sentences for which an account can be given.
Note also in (1) we speak of finding a language, rather
than the language, to which a sentence belongs.
any mathematical sentence belongs to English.

Clearly,

Such sentences

are also sentences of certain sub-languages of English, e.g.

arithmetical language, so that there is no such thing as
the language to which a given sentence belongs.

Throughout this dissertation
problem.

(1)

will present no

We will always be speaking of interpreting lan-

guages (not just sentences) so that whenever an individual
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sentence is considered, the language
to which it belongs
will already have been specified.
The contribution that this dissertation
attempts to
make to this project of giving an
adequate nominalistic

account of mathematical truth is as
follows.

Under (5), a
theory is nominalistic if it is not
ontologically committed
to any particular abstract entities
and it is not ontologically committed to the kind abstract
entity
The notion of
nominalism, as here understood, thus
depends on the notion
of ontological commitment.
This latter is a notion which is
discussed in Chapter II.
.

In that chpater criteria of ontological
commitment

are advanced which apply to formal
theories of the kind

described in later chapters.

The work here is partly supple-

mental to and partly critical of Michael
Jubien's work
([12],

[13])

on this topic.

Jubien proposed criteria which

employ the notion of a quantif icational model
structure
'\G

K

1

in the sense of Kripke

[15],
Jubien suggests
that these criteria are properly applied
only in conjunction
,

,

with certain model structures.

He makes only fleeting com-

ments, however, concerning what is an appropriate
model

structure for applying these criteria.

Chapter II attempts

to say what is an appropriate model
structure for applying

these criteria.

This involves specifying what sort of

"worLds” are to go into such a model structure.

It is also
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argued that if a model structure of the sort defined in
this

chapter is used in applying criteria of ontological commitment,

then some very simple criteria considered and rejected

by Jubien are adequate.

The notion of commitment used then

in later chapters implies that a theory is committed to a

particular if that particular exists in every world at which
that theory is true; a theory is committed to a kind k if

there are k'

s

at every world at which that theory is true.

Chapters III and IV take up (2),

(3)

and (6) above.

In Chapter III a general technique for interpreting first

order languages is considered.
is that instead of assigning

Roughly speaking, the idea

(at a world)

a single

range for

the quantifiers and single denotations for the constants and

predicates, the quantifiers, constants and predicates are

given multiple interpretations.

This technique will be

described a bit more fully, in an introductory fashion, later
in this chapter.

Employing this general technique then particular
formal languages are described, procedures are given for

translating sentences of some informal mathematical languages
into these formal languages and it is then argued that the

formal theories which represent pure mathematical theories
such as Peano arithmetic and Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory are

nominalistic
Chapter IV introduces another general technique for
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interpreting first order languages.

Again,

this technique

will be introduced in somewhat more detail later in
this
chapter, but very roughly the idea is as follows.
the quantifiers,

interpretations

As above

constants and predicates are given multiple
A sentence is true if neces sarily it is

.

true in every interpretation having certain properties
As in Chapter II, particular formal languages inter-

preted using this general technique are described;

the method

for translating from some informal mathematical languages

into these languages is given and finally it is argued
that
the formal theories which are translations of informal
mathe-

matical theories are true in the empty world (the world at

which nothing exists).

(That there is such a world,

as the

notion is used here, is a consequence of the discussion of
Chapter II.)

This, of course,

implies that these formal

theories are nominalistic.
It is to be emphasized that what are of most interest

in these chapters are the general techniques introduced, not

the particular languages described.

First, no attempt is

made to deal with all mathematical languages
examples are chosen.

.

Only certain

Also this emphasis on the general tech-

niques becomes obvious in the discussion of set theory where
in Chapter III,

are given.

two importantly different interpretations
1

It is less obvious in other places,

be kept in mind.

but it should

For example, an interpretation of a com-

bined number theory-set theory is given which allows

'

0=<6
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to be neither true nor false.

An interpretation of another

language allows (the translation of)
to be neither true nor false.

'all apples are sets'

Such results are not built

into these techniques, however, for different results
can be

obtained for these sentences using these techniques.

The

flexibility of these techniques should be emphasized.
Finally

,

throughout both of these chapters the techniques

interpretation are also applied to languages which mix

both mathematical and non-mathematical vocabulary.
In Chapters V and VI,

(4)

is considered.

These

chapters attempt to indicate the inadequacies of a platonistic interpretation of mathematical languages.

In both of

these chapters, arguments are considered which may be con-

strued as attempting to show that informal arithmetic, for
example,

is not committed to the kind number nor to any

particular.

If these arguments were sound,

this would sug-

gest (though, of course, not entail) that informal mathe-

matical language is most adequately represented by

a

language

interpreted using one of the techniques presented in the

preceding chapters.

The argument discussed in Chapter V is

that of Paul Benacerraf [2],

In Chapter VI an argument of

Jubien's is considered [14].

In both cases it is contended

that these arguments are inconslusive

.

These arguments do,

however, raise questions which are sufficient to motivate

interest in the work of Chapters III and IV.
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The treatment of (4) in this dissertation is thus

quite incomplete.

First, there is no conclusive argument

that platonism is false or that if platonism is false, then

some interpretation employing one of the techniques presented

here is correct.

Second, as emphasized above,

even if it is

assumed that some interpretation employing one of the techniques presented here is correct, little is said to justify
the claim that one particular such interpretation is correct.

For example,

some finitists and constructivists have held

that many of the sentences mathematicians generally hold to
be true are not true.

ruled out) here.

Such positions are ignored (but not

They would have to be considered in a com-

plete account of mathematical truth.
The general position to be considered 'here holds,

among other things, that although 'there are numbers' is
true,

this informal theory is not committed to the kind

number or to the kind abstract entity

.

One natural response

to this is to ask for an account of this theory which does

not imply that this theory has such commitments.

It might

well be expected that this positive project cannot be
accomplished.

That is,

able account of

'

it might be

there are numbers

'

suspected that no reasoncan be given which does

not imply that this theory is ontologically committed to
the kind number.
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Chapters III and IV attempt to show that this sus-

picion is incorrect.

That is,

this theory can be given an

account (which has some plausibility) according to which
this theory does not have such a commitment.
is

Platonism

seen not to be the only plausible basis for giving an

account of mathematical truth.

Another objection to this

general position is as follows.
This objection begins by noting that a common, even

paradigmatic, way that a theory can have an ontological com-

mitment to a kind k or an individual
'there are k's' or 'a exists'.

a is

simply to assert

From this it is concluded

that 'there are numbers' and 'one exists' must have an

ontological commitment to the kind number and the particular
one,

respectively.

Thus the general position considered

in this dissertation is untenable.
I

agree that 'there are k's' and

do have ontological commitments.

'a

In fact,

exists'

commonly

it is by using

such sentences that the notion of ontological commitment is

generally explained:

theory T is ontologically commited to

a just in case T says that a exists.

This indicates that a position which held that no

theory has ontological commitments is in a serious difficulty

how is 'exists' being used if it is claimed that no theory
says that anything exists?

Let us grant then that at least

some interpreted sentences of the form 'a exists' and 'there

are k's' must have ontological commitments.

Still this
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leaves open the possibility that this is not true in all
cases.

In particular,

the above considerations do not show

that it is untenable to hold that in mathematics sentences

which seem to have ontological commitments do not have these
commitments.

It

is just such a position which is developed

in Chapters III and IV.

The technique for interpreting first order theories

which will be investigated in Chapters III and IV has been
more or less anticipated by Hartry Field [7], Michael Jubien
([12],

[14]),

Paul Benacerraf [2], Hilary Putnam [22] and

(on Field's interpretation) Quine

[26],

We will build to

the presentation of this technique by discussing Field's

and Jubien'

s

approaches.

Hartry Field introduced the notion of partial signification (or partial reference) as a way of dealing with the

question of indeterminacy which has been raised by Quine.
To take the well-known case, Field suggests that if we were

faced with a situation in which we could translate 'gavagai'

either as 'rabbit' or 'undetached rabbit part' we should
say that 'gavagai' partially signifies the set of rabbits

and that it partially signifies the set of undetached

rabbit parts.

Now thxs, particular application of the concept of
partial signification
the concept itself is.

is of no special

interest here, but

The idea behind it is that even if

10
a

word has not been suitably "hooked up" with reality (how-

ever,

that may work) so that it has a single referent,

still

it may be that there is a class of things all of which
are

referents to that word.
case of partial reference:

Reference then

is a

special

it is that case in which a word

partially refers to only one thing.

In general, however,

the

notion of partial reference has application in situations
where, roughly, a word is used in such a way that there is

more than one thing which has equal right to be called the
referent of that word.

A very simple example of this notion

might be that if one person wrote the Iliad and another

wrote the Odyssey it might be reasonable to say the 'Homer'

partially referred to both of these authors.
A fuller understanding of this notion is, however,
only to be gained by seeing how it is used to give an inter-

pretation of a first order language.

Field uses this notion

to define the conditions under which a structure for a first

order language L partially accords with the semantics for
Lr

The idea is that L is a (formalized version of) natural

language and that the structure assigns referents to names
and extensions to predicates which those names and predicates

partially signify.
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More precisely:

The "semantics for L" then should be understood as
being the semantical properties of the language which L is
intended to mormalize.
These semantical properties would
include what the partial referents of the terms of that
language are

o

A structure M partially accords with the
semantics of L if and only if each term of L
partially denotes or partially signifies the
entity which M assigns to it.
(211)

(1)

Characterizing truth for

a

language interpreted in

this way is then easy.

A sentence of L is true if and only if it is
true-relative-to-M for every structure M that
partially accords with the semantics of -L

(2)

(

212 )

Also we may add
A sentence of L is false if and only if it is
false-relative-to-M for every structure M that
partially accords with the semantics for -L.

(3)

A simple example will illustrate the technique here,
consider the language L which has one name
place predicate

and one one-

whose intended interpretation is dis-

'F'

course concerning the fatness of Homer.
'h'

'h'

Assume as above that

partially denotes two different people a and

also that

'F'

fat people.

partially denotes only one set:

b.

Assume

the set of

There will then be two interestingly different

structures for L which partially accord with the semantics
for L.

One such structure assigns a to

assigns b to

'h'

is true;

b.

while the other

If both of them are fat

if neither of them are fat

otherwise 'Fh' is neither true nor false.

Field and
Shoenfield [31]

,

Now the truth of the sentence 'Fh' will

depend on the fatness of a and
'Fh'

'h'

I

'

Fh' is

false; while

Of course,

both use 'structure' in the sense of

12
a priori each ot these cases is possible.

an important point:

This brings out

structures which partially accord with

the semantics for L need not be elementarily equivalent:

they need not make the same sentences true.

Unfortunately

(1)

is not in general adequate,

Field points out ([7]: 214).
of this is the following.

as

The simplest sort of example

Suppose we say that 'gavagai'

partially signifies both the set of rabbits and the set of
rabbit parts.

Suppose also that another word 'gavago' also

partially signifies both of these sets, but that the native
equivalent of 'All gavagai are gavago' is false.
it might be said that

rabbit

-

'

gavagai '-' gavago

'

are paired much as

rabbit part' are paired in English.)

to (1), however,

a structure

(Thus,

According

which assigned the set of

rabbits to both 'gavagai' and 'gavago' could partially accord

with the semantics of the native language.

In such a struc-

ture the equivalent of 'All gavagai are gavago' would be
true and so by (3) this sentence would not be false.

Field says that the problem here is that 'gavagai'
and 'gavago' are "correlatively indeterminate".

Both par-

tially signify the same sets, but roughly speaking, whenever 'gavagai' signifies one set,

'gavago'

signifies another.

To deal with this ^problem, Field introduces the concept of

one term
If

t-^

being the basis of another term

is the basis of

tv,

,

tv,

(t-^bCt^)).

then the signification of

t

2

is a
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function of the signification of
if it does not have a basis.
(1“)

A term is independent
is then revised as follows.

(1)

A structure M partially accords with the
semantics of L if and only if (M(t) is the
signification of t in M)
(a)

each independent term of L partially
denotes or partially signifies M(t)

(b)

each dependent term t of L denotes or
signifies M(t) relative to the correlation of M(b(t)) with b (t)

This presents us with two problems.

First, what

exactly is it for one term to be the basis of another?
Second, what does (b) of (1*) assert?

can be dealt with fairly easily.

The second problem

What Field has in mind

here is that M assigns a dependent term

t

relative to what M assigns the basis of

t.

made precise as follows.
tion

f

for a language.

the correct value

This can be

We introduce the notion of a funcf

is a function of three arguments

whose first and second domains both consist of all the terms
and predicates of L and whose third domain and whose range

consist of all sets.
a set a
f

When given

a

term

t

of L,

its basis and

(the signification of the basis of t) as arguments,

gives as value a set.

This latter set would be the signifi-

cation of t relative to the assignment of a to its basis.

may interpret
(b

'

(b)

of (1*) then as saying that

the function f for L is such that M(t)=
(

f(t,

M(b(t)).

This is, of course, very schematic.

nothing about which of the functions

r

Field tells us

are functions for a

We
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language, except that they are supposed to operate in such
a

way that the difficulty we have considered concerning

(1)

can be avoided; nor, to return to the first problem, does he
say what it is to be the basis of a term.

problem

is

general.
ample,

A more serious

that there is no guarantee that (1*) will work in
It does seem to work in many cases.

Thus,

for ex-

suppose, we have a simple arithmetical language L

whose non -logical vocabulary consists of a one-place function
letter
that

and a name
S

'O'

is the basis of

.

Then it would be natural to say

'O'

and that a structure M partially

accords with the semantics of L if M('0')= the "zero" of

what M assigns to

'S'

of ordered paris, M('O')

(That is,
is the

if 'S’

is assigned a set

unique thing which is the

first member of one such ordered pair, but is not the second

member of any such ordered pair.)

This essentially tells us

what the function f is for the language

L.

There is, however, a serious problem for this approach.

Suppose that both 'gavagai' and 'gavago' partially

signify the set of rabbits, the set of rabbit parts and the
set of rabbit stages and that the native equivalent of 'All

gavagai are gavago' is false.

Suppose now that we attempt

to interpret that fragment L of the native language whose

non- logical vocabulary consists only of the predicates
'gavagai' and 'gavago'.

We have seen above that if we let

15

both

'

gavagai' and

out that

gavago

'

be independent,

'All gavagai are gavago'

assume chat
a

1

gavagai

is

it will turn

is not false.

So let us

the basis of 'gavago' and consider

structure M which assigns the set of rabbits to 'gavagai'.

Intuitively M could assign either the set of rabbit parts or
the set of rabbit stages to 'gavago' and still partially

accord with the semantics for

L.

However, the function

for L must assign one of these sets

f

(and not the other) to

and so it seems that either the structure which

'gavago'

assigns the set of undetached rabbit parts to 'gavago' or
the structure which assigns the set of rabbit stages to

'gavago'
L.

does not partially accord with the semantics for

This is an undesirable result.
This problem could be solved if we dropped the re-

quirement

that there be a single function for a language.

If we allowed that there could be two functions for the

language L above the p rob lei^ would be solved.

However, we

are still left with the primitive notions of a function for
a language and a term being the basis of another term.

Until

something more is said about these notions, there is no
guarantee that even this further complication will be adequate
in general.

Furthermore, throughout all of this the notion

of partial signification plays a minimal role and, as Field
says,

"the existence of such correspondence relations as

16

[this]

is not a cause for much satisfaction unless we can

use them in an explanation of truth and falsehood" ([7]: 209).

What is unclear here is whether the notion of partial sig-

nification will actually do any work when it is finally said
what a function for a language is.
The notion of partial signification was introduced
to deal with situations where different

things have equal

right to be the signification of a term (or predicate).

problem we have run into here

is,

The

roughly, that we cannot in

general form structures which partially accord with the
semantics for a language by making arbitrary choices among
the partial significations of the terms of that language.

Intuitively, we have to look at the structure as a whole and
see whether it is adequate.

raised above,

I

In the light of the difficulties

think then that it is best for our purposes

to take the notion of

'partial accordance'

(or as it will be

called here 'acceptability') as primitive,

remain intact.

.

(2)

and (3) then

We no -longer need (1*) although the idea

behind it may be helpful in explaining in certain cases which
structures are acceptable for the semantics for a language.
Also, 'partial signification' can be defined:

partially signifies a in L if there
is

is a

acceptable for the^semantics for L and

a term

t_

structure M which
t

signifies a in M.

Just as partial signification is a generalization
of signification,

so the notion of a structure being
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acceptable is a generalization of the notion of a structure
being intended, as, for example, when it is said that
a certain model is the intended or standard structure for a
language.

The notion of being an intended structure is a

special case of being an acceptable structure:
case where it is the only acceptable structure.

it is the

In general,

however, we will speak of acceptable structures in cases

where

,

for one reason or another,

it is not appropriate to

speak of the intended structure of the language.
As Field points out, one possible application of the

notion of an acceptable structure is to problems of vagueness.

"Red",

fuzzy,

set as its extension.

has

'red'

for example,

does not have a single, nonTo interpret a language which

as its only non-logical vocabulary, we would not

interpret it by a single structure, but by a class of acceptable structures.

To be acceptable, a structure must in-

clude some things in the extension of 'red', e.g. ripe

tomatoes, but acceptable structures could diverge over

whether to assign certain other things to the extension of
red'

A sentence of the language would be true if it was

true in all (or perhaps "most") of the acceptable structures
for the language,

false if it was false in all (or perhaps

"most") of the acceptable structures for the language and

indeterminate otherwise.

This may serve to indicate the

possible applications of the notion.

I

believe that the
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idea is fairly clear.

We will have more to say about the

notion of an acceptable structure, as applied
to the case
°f interpreting mathematical languages later.
We have now arrived at a generalization
of a tech-

nique for interpreting first order languages
which is employed by Michael Jubien as a way of formally
representing

informal mathematical theories which are believed
not to
have certain ontological commitments.
Both the question of
ontological commitment and this application to an
account of

mathematical truth will be of interest to us later, but
for
now we are interested only in the general technique.
Jubien

s

approach is as follows

.

In some cases

constants and predicates of a language do not have referents
and extensions (for whatever reason) so that it is not
pos-

sible to interpret this language (in accordance with the

semantics for that language) by a single structure which
assigns objects to constants and extensions to predicates.
Even so, in some of these cases the language (and a theory

stated in that language) may provide enough information so
that it is possible to say what the intended isomorphism

type of a structure of that language would be.

For such

languages (and Jubien thinks that mathematical languages are

prime examples of this) it may be appropriate to interpret

them not by a single structure but by
‘-he

intended isomorphism type.

a set

of structures of

Subject to a complication to
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be noted shortly, truth of a sentence is characterized as

truth in all such structures.
such structures.

Falsehood

is

falsehood in all

Note that the requirement that the inter-

preting structures be isomorphic implies that if a sentence
is true

(false) in one of these structures, it is true (false)

in all such structures.

Thus no room is left for sentences

which are neither true nor false.
It is clear in what sense Jubien's technique is a

special case of the technique discussed above.

Jubien's

technique coincides with the latter technqiue in the special
case in which the acceptable structures for a language are

pairwise isomorphic.

It is only a special case,

for in

general there Is no requirement that the acceptable structures of a language be isomorphic.

In fact,

there is no

requirement that the acceptable structures for

a

language

be elementarily equivalent and it is this which allows for
the possibility that there are sentences of a language inter-

preted by a set of acceptable structures which are neither
true nor false.
Of course, the terminology introduced above carries

over to Jubien's technique.

Thus we may say, for example,

that the constants of the theories (if there are any) which
are properly -interpreted in accordance with Jubien's tech-

nique have (multiple) partial referents.

Although the con-

stants of such theories do not have referents, they do have
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partial referents.
The complication in Jubien's approach which
was

noted above is that it involves the notion of
necessity.
He is interested in interpreting theories which
(1)

for

whatever reason are not appropriately interpreted
by a
single structure (2) do, however, provide enough
information
so that

it is possible to tell what the intended
isomorphism

type of a model of that theory would be
(3) but which could
be true even if there actually were no model of
that intended

isomorphism type.

The technique as thus far described en-

counters difficulties over

(3)

.

If there are no acceptable

structures for a theory, then on the characterization of
truth as truth in all acceptable structures, every sentence
of such a theory would be true.

terize truth as

:

Alternatively if we charac-

A is true in L if there is an acceptable

structure for L and A is true in all acceptable structures
to L,

and falsehood as: A is false in L if A is false in all

acceptable structures for

L,

we would get the result that

every sentence of such a theory is false.

Both of these

results are unacceptable.

Jubien suggests that to interpret such theories we
consider all possiole models of the intended isomorphism
type.

A sentence of a language L

is then true if

necessarily

tor every model' of the intended isomorphism type that sen-

tence is true in that model.
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Once again, this may be generalized to the
case

where not all the acceptable structures for a
language are
isomorphic.
Truth (and falsehood) are defined as
before.

Our results may now be summarized (these definitions are preliminary and will be superceded
in later chapters)

An acceptably interpreted first order language
(AIL)

:

is an ordered pair ^L, M^> where L is a
first order language

and M is a set of structures of

A sentence A of an AIL

L.

(h, M> is true if M=e$ and A is true in all m in
M;

it is

false if it is false in all m in M.

A modally acceptably interpreted first order language
(MAIL)

is an ordered pair (h,

language and

$

where L is a first order

is a sentence of the form:

acceptable for X if

a structure S is

A sentence A is true in

_.

if necessarily for all structures S if S is accept-

able for L, then A is true in

S;

if necessarily for all structures
L,

then A

-is

false in

S.

it is
S

if

false in
S

is acceptable for

-

Before proceeding to a fuller discussion of AIL's
and MAIL

1

s

,

other anticipations of the technique employed

here may be noted.

When Paul Benacerraf says, "Number

theory is the elaboration of the properties of all structures of the order type of the numbers.
do not have single referents,"

([2]:

The number words

70-1) one plausible

way of interpreting him is to say that he thinks that
the
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language of arithmetic is properly understood
as an AIL and
that numerals do not have single referents
but that they do
have partial referents.

When Hilary Putnam says, "Now the natural
way to
interpret set-theoretic statements in the
modal-logical
language is to interpret them as statements
of what would
necessarily be the case if there were standard
models for
the set theories in question,"
([22]:

20)

he appears to be

considering the possibility of interpreting set
theory as
a MAIL.

Since interpretations by sets of structures
may be

somewhat unfamiliar and since such interpretations
in general
allow for sentences to be indeterminate, i.e.
neither true
nor false, some elementary points about the
logic of languages interpreted in this way may be in order.

We restrict
our attention to cases where the set of
structures used to

interpret a language is non-empty.

Thus we consider inter-

pretations by arbitrary, non-empty sets of structures.

We

say that a sentence is valid* if it is true in
all such

interpretations
(1)

All and only classical first order logical

truths are valid*.

The proof of this is obvious.

This dif-

ferentiates the interpretation studied here from other
familiar interpretation which allow a third truth
value,
but,

relative to which not all classical logical truths are

valid.
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(2)

if A is false

Obviously, -A is true (false)
(true)

(indeterminate).

(indeterminate)

The situation with

respect to disjunctions is somewhat more complicated.

If

either (or both) A or B are true, then AvB is true.

If

both A and B are false, their disjunction is false.

If one

is

indeterminate and the other is false, their disjunction

is

indeterminate (since it is true in the non-empty set of

structures in which the indeterminate disjunct is true and
false in the non-empty set of structures in which the inde-

terminate disjunct is false).

Thus far disjunction operates

on this interpretation just as it operates in Kleene's
strong

three-valued logic.
B are

The remaining case in which both A and

indeterminate admits of two possibilities.

On this

assumption, AvB cannot be false (since it is true in any of
the structures in which A is true,

for example), but it

can be either indeterminate or true.

If A is indeterminate,

then AvA illustrates the first possibility, while Av-A

illustrates the second possibility.

More generally, if A

and B are indeterminate, the AvB is true just in case the

union of the set of structures in which A is true and the
set of structures in which B is true is equal to the full
set of structures which interprets A and B; otherwise AvB
is

indeterminate.

fhis once again differentiates inter-

pretations by sets of structures from other interpretations

which allow a third truth value.
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CHAPTER

II

In later chapters we will be discussing the
ontolo-

gical commitments of theories.

It is thus important here to

discuss the notion of ontological commitment.

In doing this

we will also be introducing certain technical notions
and

metaphysical presuppositions to be used in later chapters.
In particular a special notion of a world will be
introduced

which plays an important role in later chapters.

The dis-

cussion here follows the work of Michael Jubiel
([12],

[13])

quite closely and is partly supplementary to and partly

critical of that work.
It is taken here as established that ontological

commitment is an intensional notion.

In assuming this we

are siding with Cartwright [3], Jubien [11],

extent) Parsons ([18],

against Quine ([23],

[19]),

(to a certain

Scheffler and Chomsky [14]

[27]) who claims that ontological com-

mitment is a notion which belongs to the theory of reference.
What this means is that in stating conditions for the satis-

faction of 'T is ontologically committed to

x'

we need to

use some notion such as entailment, analyticity or possibility.
,

With Jubien

^7e

)

distinguish between commitment to

kinds and commitment to particulars.
are people'

Intuitively,

'there

carries commitment of the first kind, while

'Nixon exists'

carries commitment of the latter kind.

We
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distinguish between de re and de dicto commitment
to
particulars.
Intuitively, 'Carter exists’
has a commitment de re to Carter, but (given an "attributive"
a.L.so

use of

the definite description 'the President')

'the President

exists' does not have a de re commitment to Carter,
but does

have a de dicto commitment to there being a unique
President.
The important difference here is that the latter
theroy

places no restriction on who is the President, while
the
former theory says that some particular individual
exists.

Parsons considers (without endorsing) the following

criterion of commitment to kinds:

([19]:

74),

ont °l°gically committed to kind k if T
(*) X
~
entails that there are things of kind k. ~
's

The analogous criterion of de re commitment is
,oV
T is ontologically committed de re to a if
(
)
T entails that a exists.

In what follows we will largely be concerned with
discussing

this criterion of de re commitment.

A few obvious remarks

about (**) are that it is unclear just what sense of 'entails'
is employed.
'T

entails

true,

g_'

For example,

if we accept the equivalence of

with 'in every possible world in which T is

£ is true' then corresponding to different senses of

'possible world' we will obtain different senses of 'entails'
and thus different versions of (**)

.

It is also,

of course,

conceivable that 'entails' is used in some entirely different
way.

.

Further evaluation of (**) thus requires that more be
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said about how

entails

is being used.

what the ranges of the variables

T
'

’

It is also unclean

and

'a'

are which are

used in (**)
In later chapters we will be concerned with evalua-

ting the ontological commitments of certain formal theories

which are interpreted by sets of intensional interpretations.
Thus,

it is natural to discuss

of the variable

T
'

'

(**)

by restricting the range

to such formal theories and then asking

whether there is some sense of 'entails' in which (**)
restricted,

is true.

,

so

In doing this we will also be forced

to say what the range of 'a'

is in

(**)

.

We could then ask

whether there is some generalization of (**) which is true
when applied to a more general class of theories.

Thus, we

proceed by introducing this formal method of intensionally
interpreting theories and then ask whether various versions
of (**) are plausible when applied to such theories.
Of course, primarily what we are interested in are

the ontological commitments of informal theories which

people actually hold.

„

Initially at least it would appear

that it is only such theories which have ontological com-

mitments.

From this point of view we regard the ontological

commitments of formal theories as derived from the commitments of the informal theories they represent.

Now a given informal theory might be formalized in
number of different ways and different criteria of commitment
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might be required to give the correct results
for these
different formal theories.
For example, it might be that
informal theory T has two different formalizations

T'

and

T" and that there are two different criteria
of commitment
C'

and C" such that the commitments of

t'

relative to

C'

and the commitments of T" relative to C" are
precisely
those of T, but that applying either
gives incorrect answers.

C'

to T" or C" to T

1

If we then think of the conunitments

of formal theories as relative to that of informal
theories

they represent, then we need to ask not whether
such and
such a criterion is correct absolutely, but whether
it is

correct relative to a certain method of representing
informal

theories as formal theories.

This will be disucssed (and

an actual example given) later in this chapter.

Thus far we have spoken as if we can speak of the

ontological commitments of formal theories only relative to
informal theories they represent.

From such a point of view

the only point of introducing formal theories is
to introduce
some regimentation into discussions of ontological
commitment.

In fact,

formal theories.

there is another reason to introduce these
In certain cases it may be controversial

just exactly what the ontological commitments of an informal

theory are.

(The examples to be discussed at length in

this dissertation are mathematical theories.)

Given this

we might want to discuss the ontological commitments
of
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formal theories independently of whether they
are representations of these problematic informal theories
and only later
(and partly in the basis of what the
commitments of the formal
theories are) ask whether the formal theories
adequately

represent the informal theories.

The assumption here which
we make is that the notion of commitment
applies not only to
informal theories and to formal theories relative
to some

translation, but also to formal theories outright.

must judge whether or not. this is true.

The reader

The claim here would

be that these formal theories are enough like
informal

theories so that we can ask of them (outright)
whether they
have or lack certain ontological commitments.
If we can do
this,

then we can ask whether or not certain criteria
of

commitment for such theories are correct absolutely
and not
just relative to informal theories they represent.
Throughout much of this chapter it will be this question
of relative

correctness which will be considered.

In later chapters,

however, the criteria developed here will be applied
outright
to formal theories.

We take the notion of an intensionally interpreted

theory (IIT) essentially from Jubien,

major difference from Jubien'

s

([13]:

516-7),

the

account being that we do not

treat constants a(sjrj.gid designators and also allow
that
'

-

(Ex) (x=a)

'

Thus,

can be true at some worlds.

classical first order theories will be a
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subset of the class of theories defined here.

The added

breadth gained by allowing certain constants not to denote
at some worlds is an advantage when we attempt to formally

represent informal theories such as 'God does not exist'.
In order to do this, however,

a decision must be made con-

cerning how to treat non-denoting constants semantically.
We make the decision that for atomic predicates, P n

sequence does not satisfy P n (...a.

a

,

if a is undefined.

..)

Otherwise the clauses in the definition of satisfaction
are the same as in the definition of satisfaction for

classical first order theories.

Truth in a structure

then is just satisfaction by all sequences.

Using the notion of a quantif icational model
structure

R

K,

we define an intensional interpreta

^

,

tion of a theory T to be an ordered set
= </ A

1

;

p

p

,

v

2

1

'12

I

,

.

.

.

;

a

p

a ,...>
12
,

/

1

which satisfies the following conditions
in K,

A(H)

if ou

is

tions)

;

ct

1(H);

(2)

(1)

:

for each H in K and

defined at H (the

cu

for each H

a^(H)eA(H)

i,

are not in general total func

and (3) for each H in K and

i,

j_,

P

,

(H)c[I(H)

1
]

.

j

In general, we denote

'12

2

1

<A(H);p

(H) .p'cH)
l

by

'

1(H)'.

,

.

.

.

(H)

;p
1

,

.

.

.

;a, (H) ,a

(H)
2

~

,

.

.

\/

/

We then—def ine

H if it is true in 1(H).

:

a sentence is true at a world
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A (H)

is the range of the quantifiers at H.

It may

be a proper subset of Y (H) if we do not want the quantifiers
to range over all the things which exist at a world (as for

example is the case in Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, the

quantifiers of which range only over sets)
The justification for allowing constants not to de-

note was the facilitate the representation of such theories
as

'God does not exist'

we will want

'

-

If this is going to be interesting,

.

(Ex) (x=g)

'

to be true at some worlds.

In

order to do this, a free logic should be adopted for dealing

with ITT's.
The point of this definition is that instead of

simply assigning extensions to predicates and denotations to
constants, predicates are assigned functions from worlds to

extensions and constants are assigned partial functions from

worlds to denotations.

Roughly speaking, an intensional

interpretation could be thought of as a function from worlds
to extensional interpretations.

We are then interested in seeing if some version of
(**)

is plausible

when applied to IIT's.

We might then make

(**) more precise then by saying

an IIT, T, is ontologically committed de re to
(1)
a if aeT (H) for every H at which t is true.

The analogous version of (*) would be
an IIT, T, is ontologically committed to
(2)
kind k if for every H at which T is true, the
set o:F things which are of kind k at H
— is non-

empty.
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Whereas
so foi

(2)

(1)

is well-defined for any IIT,

this is not

In order to apply (2) we need to ask
whether

.

there are things which are of kind k at H for
worlds H at

which T is true.

This,

however, will not make sense for

ITT's which are defined relative to certain
model structures.

Let me give an example before moving to the
general

point

Consider the model structure

.

0

(

® 1

(0,1}x{0,1}^>, {<0, (Nixon, Ford })>

<1, (Nixon }^}
Then define an intensional interpretation for
a theory whose
sole non- logical axiom is
(Ex)Fx' as follows.
For each H,
»

,

}

\

»

,

'

let A(H)=1(H) and let the interpretation of
'F'

We have now specified an IIT.

trouble applying

(1)

do is to ask whether,

to this theory.

(1)

1(H)

Note that there is no
All that we have to

for example, Nixon is in 1(H)

every H at which the theory is true.
to

also be

for

He is and so according

this theory is committed de re to Nixon (though not

to Ford)

Ask now whether this theory is committed to the kind
politician.
is a

In order to do this we need to find out if Nixon

politician in the world

1.

Is he?

There is no saying

because in specifying the IIT we did not have to say whether
Nixon is a politician in

1.

The moral is that we can only apply (2) to IIT's

^hich are defined relative to model structures for which we
can ask for arbitrary kinds k and worlds H whether
there are
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things of kind k at H.

That is, we need to be able to ask

not only whether arbitrary sentences of the object language
are true at worlds (we get that when we define the IIT) but

we also need to be able to ask whether sentences of the

metalanguage, e.g.

'there are things of kind k at H'

,

are

true at the worlds in the model structure used to define
the IIT.

For many purposes, e.g. defining validity, we need

only the technical notion of an object language sentence
true at a world in a model structure.

For purposes

of assessing the ontological commitments of theories in

accordance with

(2)

,

we need the informal notion of a sen-

tence of the metalanguage being true at a world.

What sort

of things are such that sentences of the metalanguage are
true at them?

It

is

natural to turn here to the metaphysical

notion (as opposed to the purely technical notion needed for
defining validity) of a possible world.

Sentences of the

metalanguage are true at possible worlds (in
but not a technical,
In short,

metaphysical,

sense of 'possible world').

for the purposes of assessing ontological

commitments in accordance with
a

a

(2)

,

it appears that we need

notion which is much like the metaphysical notion of a

possible world usedj for example,, by Plantinga.
then be proposed that we apply

(1)

It might

and (2) only to IIT's

which have been defined relative to the model structure the
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worlds of which are the metaphysically possible worlds.
If this approach is taken,

believe that
ment.

(1)

there is no reason to

is an adequate criterion of de re commit-

There may well be things which exist in every meta-

physically possible world.

If so,

(1)

will imply that every

IIT is committed de re to each of these necessary existents

Note that we are making a double point here.

First,

this

argument shows that (1), so understood, is inadequate because
there is no way of interpreting informal theories as formal

theories in such a way that

(1)

applied to the formal theory

implies that that formal theory has exactly the de re commit-

ments that, intuitively, the informal theory has (assuming
there are necessary existents).

Second, apart from con-

siderations of representing informal theories, it is un-

acceptable that every IIT should be committed de re to, say,
God.

We can then either give up (1) or look for a dif-

ferent model structure.

In fact,

there is independent reason

to look for a different model structure.

Even if there are

abstract entities which metaphysically necessarily exist, we
might still want to consider the ontological commitments of
theories which imply that there are no abstract entities,
e.g.

'there are no abstract entities'.

Even if God neces-

sarily exists, we (might still want to consider that ontological commitments of theories which imply that there is no
God.
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In order to meet these desiderata, we want to define

IIT relative to a structure which embodies in some sense
a broader notion of possibility that the notion of meta-

physical possibility.
([13]:

This point is also made by Jubien

527-8), who does not, however,

structure would be.

say what that model

What follows then can be understood as,

among other things, a supplement to Jubien'

mitment

s

theory of com-

.

What do we want of such a model structure?
this:

for every set of entities there is a world at which

all and only the members of that set exist.
to let there be worlds at which,

given,

At least

We also want

to take the example just

there are concrete entities but no abstract entities.

We also want a model structure relative to which for ar-

bitrary kinds k we can say whether there are things of kind
k at a given world.

Typically, we will also want to specify an IIT by

saying things like, "for every world
tion of

'

Bxy

'

H,

let the interpreta-

at H be the set of ordered pairs

that at H x is the brother of y.

"

<^x,

such

Thus we need not only to

be able to specify whether there are things of kind K at H,

we also need to be able to specify the interpretations of
the predicates

indicated.

o-f

the language in the wholesale fashion just

Note that this cannot be done within the approach

taken here if we take the technical notion of a world dis-

cussed earlier.

If we used that notion,

essentially the
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most that could be done would be to give a piecemeal
inter-

pretation for the predicates, e.g., "at
pretations of

'

B

'

be

{

(a,^>

.^b.a^

,

at H

H,
2

,

let the inter-

let

"
.

.

.

A final condition is that "kind-necessities" be

preserved in every world in the model structure.

I

follow

Quine [24] and Jubieri ([12]: 86-7) in thinking that the

theory 'there are fish' has a commitment not only to the
kitid f isn but

also to the kind animal.

Now if we are to

evaluate commitment to kinds in accordance with

means that if something is of the kind fish at

this

(2)

a

world

H,

then it must be of the kind animal at H.
The proposal to be advanced here attempts to meet

these conditions by making use of the notions of a kind,
a

property and metaphysical possibility.

One might con-

ceive of a reduction of this rather liberal set of meta-

physical notions as follows.

Kinds are simply certain

properties and if the only properties which are of interest
in this context are those expressed by English predicates,

then properties could be reduced to predicates.

I

have no

suggestion as to how to reduce the notion of metaphysical
possibility.

A world H relative to
as an ordered pair

a

/x,M^ where

language L is then defined
(1)

x is a set and (2)

f
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is a

function which maps each kind

to a subset of x (the

set of things of kind k at H) and which maps each primitive

predicate

'P

n
'

of L to an ordered pair

an n-ary property (the meaning of 'P
x

n

(the things which have P

n

at H)

.

n

')

f

<EV>
and

y_

where

P

n

is

is a subset of

must meet the following

conditions
of x there is a kind k such

(a)

for every member
that zef (k)

(b)

for any set S, S' of kinds and thing z, if
for each k in S and it is metaphysically
necessary that if something is of each of the
kinds in S, then it is of at least one of the
kinds in S'
then for some k' in S'
z_ef (k' )

z

z_ef (k)

,

,

This construction relies on the assumption that
there is a set of all kinds. If there were no such set, then
the functions f used to define worlds would not exist. I
am unsure as to whether this assumption is justified since
I am uncertain what some of the important properties of
kinds are.
For example, is the "negation" of a kind a kind?
What about disjunctions? Is being Nixon a kind? I am not
sure.
If this assumption is unjustified, the definition of
a world would have to be altered; perhaps along the lines of
the definition of an appropriate model structure given below.

Annther question is: What things are members of x,
where <^c,f^ is a world? Clearly anything which actually
The issue here is
exists could be a member of such an x.
whether there are non-existent entities and, if so, whether
If both of these consuch entities are members of sets.
ditions are satisfied, then we might well want such entities
Doing
to be the members of some x, where (x, f^> is a world.
this would allow for the possibility of having de re comI have deliberately left
mitments to non-existent entities.
the constructions in this chapter neutral between whether or
not non-existent entities figure in the worlds we define.
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for any primitive predicate 'P n
n
n
and thing z,
if f ( P

(c)

’

of L, kind k

and
=^
^52£n -l^-l
and
it
is meta’^n-i l)
physically necessary that for all x
x -1
-1
n ,
„
stands in the relation
— 1•Kn _
1
P
then z is of kind k, then zef (k)
'

'

)

,

.

.

.

,’

'

’

.

are intended to force f to preserve kind-necessities,

(a) -(c)

intuitively

(a)

and

(c)

are supposed to force things into

some kind or other and (b) is supposed to keep them in
the

correct
is

of)

kinds given that they are in one given kind.

also added so that, for example,
'

(Ex)

(Ey) (XE2.)

'

if zef/k)

(not had by its simpler

and it is metaphysically necessary that

anything of kind k is of kind
(i)

natural formalization

might be committed to the kind set.

Some consequences of (b)

sub-case:

(a

(c)

k'

then z£f (k

,

'

) )

are

assuming that necessarily all rational animals
are humans, but not necessarily all rational
things are humans, if ze f (rational) and
zef ( animal )
then zef ( human)";
,

(ii)

If ycx, then either zef (concrete) or
zsf abstract )
(This result also relies on
la)
(a) forces everything to be a member of
some kind and (b) forces the member of any
kind to be either concrete or abstract. We
explicitly rely on (ii) in Chapter III where
it is argued that if there are infinitely
many things at H, but only one concrete thing,
then there are abstract things at H.
.

•

It would now be natural to let

<^G,

K,

R^>,

¥

be defined

by stipulating that K=the set of all worlds; R=KxK; ¥(H)=x,

where H=^x,

f^>

and G= (y_,

f^>

where y=the set of things which

actually exist and for each kind

k,

f(k)=the set of things
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which actually are of kind

k.

Such a natural approach will, however, lead
to
paradox.

assume that the set theory used in defining this

I

model structure is Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with
individuals.
Then there is no set of all sets.
Therefore, there
is no set

y which

the set of things which actually exist.

is

Therefore, G does not exist.

Also there are kinds, e.g.

set

such that there is no set of all the things of that
kind.
Thus f (where
more,

G=<^y,

f))

is only a partial function.

Further-

there is a difficulty with K even apart from the dif-

ficulty with

G:

there will be no set of all worlds.

This,

of course, also affects the specification of R and
¥

This is quite a serious problem.
if (1)

On the one hand,

to be applied as a criterion of de re commitment,

is

there must be many different kinds of worlds.

This was seen

above where it was noted that there is no reason to believe
that

(1)

is adequate if we consider only the

possible worlds.

metaphysically

On the other hand, paradoxes must be

avoided.
The most elegant solution would be obtained if there
was a clearly understood theory which allowed there to be

totality which "contained" all sets and which allowed such
totalities to be "members". of other totalities.
is a totality

totality.)

which is

a

(Thus G

"member" of K which is also a

In the absence of such a theory a slightly
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complicated set-theoretical construction

is required.

On this approach it is natural to define
G and K

m

such a way that they are guaranteed to be
sets, but to
put enough conditions on K to guarantee that
the members of
K reflect the important properties of all the
worlds.
is just

ever,

how we proceed.

That

Proceeding in this way forces, how.

giving up speaking of the model structure (relative

to a language)

.

Instead we define the notion of an appro -

priate model struxture.
In an appropriate model structure G=
is

all

where x

simply some set of things which actually exist and for
z.

in x and kinds k,

zpf(k) if z is actually of kind k.

This guarantees that G will be a set.

G is,

roughly, a

iragment of what would ordinarily be regarded as the actual
world.
set

In an appropriate model structure K is simply some

worlds which meets the conditions below.

R=KxK and

T (H)=x,

As before

where H=^x, f^.

We require that K satisfy:
(Rl)

For any mutually disjoint sets a, b, it is not
the case that in every H in K in which all of
the members of a exist, all of the members of
b exist.

(R2)

For any sets S, S' of kinds, if there is a
world at which all of the members of S are
exemplified, but none of the members of S'
are exemplified, then there is an H in K~
where H=(x, f> and for every k in S, f(k),M
and for every k' in S' f(k')=j5\
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(l-v3)

(Rl)

is

For anything x and kind k if there is a world
at which x is not of kind k and there is a
world H in K at which x exists, then there is
a world in K at which x is not of kind k.

designed to guarantee that there are no "ontological

dependencies" in

K:

saying that some set of things exists

will not guarantee that some other thing exists.
(R3)

(R2)

and

are designed to guarantee that the only kind dependencies

that there are in K are those which exist throughout all
the

worlds
It

is

important to verify that K in fact is a set.

(It might be thought that

to be a set.)
is

(R1)-(R3) force K to be too large

This is easily done.

One way of showing this

to begin with enough worlds to satisfy (R2) and then add

worlds to that set so as to satisfy (Rl)

.

Adding worlds can-

not keep the resultant set from satisfying (R2)

we add worlds so as to satisfy (R3)

.

.

Finally

The set achieved

thereby clearly i£ a set and also satisfies these three
conditions
Is an appropriate model structure the general sort

of model structure we seek?

(We,

of course, obtain a partic-

ular model structure relative to a language by assigning

meanings to the predicates of that language.)

First, note

that we wanted a model structure relative to which we could

ask whether there ar$ things of kind k at H for arbitrary

kinds k and worlds

H.

This notion (which we have already

used in stating the conditions above) is now easily defined:
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there are things of kind k at H (H=<4, f^>
if f(k)^0.
An appropriate model structure also
embodies the

broad notion of possibility we need for
discussing ontological commitment.
First, (Rl) guarantees that there
are no

ontological dependencies.

Second,

(R2) implies that there
are worlds at which there are concrete
things, but no ab-

stract things.

On the other hand,

in any world

at which there are fish there are animals.

Note also that
by (R3) for no thing x and kind k is x of k
at every world
at which it exists

(provided that it is not metaphysically

necessary that everything is of k

)

.

kind concrete entity

for example,

So,

some world Nixon is not of the kind human

,

in

nor even of the

We could summarize this by saying

.

that an appropriate model structure preserves
kind-neces-

sities

,

but not individual-necessities.

This implies that 'Nixon exists'

(interpreted in

the obvious way as an IIT) is not committed to
the kind

human according to (2).
it is,
it

Is that correct?

but this is. a difficult case.

is incorrect,

I

think that

If one thinks that

the opposite result can be achieved by

adding a new condition which must be met by the functions
f

used to identify the worlds.
(R“)

For any set

This condition would be

of kinds and member z of x,
if it is metaphysically necessary that Xf
z. exists
then it is of one of the kinds
in S, then z is a member of f(k) for some
lc
in S.
,
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Note also some oddities of the concept of a world

which
ments.

I

propose we use for evaluating ontological commitIf we suppose that being an animal and being a

vegetable are kinds, then on the definition of a world given
above there will be worlds at which something is both an

animal and a vegetable.

In fact,

there is nothing to keep

something from being both a vegetable and

non-vegetable

a

at a world (assuming that the latter is a "kind)
I

do not think that this result has any undesirable

consequences for ontological commitment.

In fact,

it has

the desirable consequence that we can evaluate the ontological

commitments of the rather strange theories which may, in
fact, be held.

This result simply indicates that a model

structure which is appropriate for considerations of

ontological commitment might not be appropriate for other
purposes.

In any case,

this result could easily be blocked

by adding a new condition (which is easily stated) which

must be met by the functions f used to identify the worlds.

Adding this condition would not, as far as

I

can tell,

affect our further discussion of ontological commitment.
Note finally the consequences if we have a

model structure relative to a language containing a

two-place predicate

'

Bxy

'

and if that predicate is

assigned the property brother by the worlds of the
model structure.

Then there will be worlds at which
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both

I

and my actual brother exist, but are not brothers.

There will also be worlds at which

I

have a brother, but

(assuming that having a parent is a kind)
however,

If,

I

have no parent.

it is metaphysically necessary that if some-

thing has a brother then it is an animal, then (c)
implies
chat in any world in which
I

I

have a brother

I

am an animal.

do not think that we need conditons beyond (a)

-

(c)

,

but it is important to see that the approach outlined here
is

fairly flexible.

Such conditions should be added only

if they are needed to give the correct results for ontologi-

cal commitment.

Roughly speaking, we want to impose minimal

structure on these worlds so as to be able to evaluate the

commitments of as many theories as possible.
Michael Jubien has raised some powerful objections
to (1)

([13]:

Jubien'

s

518-9).

objections to

I

want now to see just how convincing

(I)

are if we apply (1) to IIT's

defined relative to the model structure we have just described.
(Of course,

way,

Jubien did not consider

(1)

restricted in this

so that we will not directly be criticizing his claims.)

Jubien claims that although an IIT may "say nothing
about" some thing, that thing might "happen" to exist in

every world at which that theory is true.
(1)

In such a case

would imply that the IIT is committed de re to that

thing in spite of the fact that intuitively the IIT does not
say-

enough about that thing to be committed to it.

While

I
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think that this point is correct when applied
to IIT's defined relative to arbitrary model structures,
it is not
clearly correct when applied to the particular
case we are
considering.
It will be useful to distinguish two
sorts of
this "inflated domain" counterexample to
(1)

Necessary beings

(i)

exists in every

'¥

(H)

.

If there is anything which

that thing will exist in every y(H) at

which an IIT is true, regardless of whether that IIT says
anything at all about that thing.
Clearly, however, there are no such necessary beings
in an appropriate model structure ^G,

Thus,

K,

there

can be no such inflated domain counterexamples to
(1) given
our restriction.

(H)

Popping-up

not necessarily exist,

entities

Even if something does

.

it might "pop up"

H at which an IIT is true,

(exist)

in every

regardless of whether that IIT

says anything at all about that thing.

Here is an example

of this:

Let the sole non-logical axiom of T be '(Ex)Fbc'
fine I by letting A (K) = Qp) for every H and letting
ii/

'

F

De-

.

'

be

assigned the set of things which are cows at H at any world
H at which Nixon exists and letting

'

F'

have the null ex-

tension at any world at which Nixon does not exist.

Then,

committed de re to Nixon.
(1)

might be rejected on the basis of such a case

on the grounds that

<^T,

I^>

lacks the syntactic means of
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picking out

Nixon and that a necessary (though not a suf-

ficient) condition of a theory's being committed de re to,
say

Nixon is that it have the syntactic means of "picking

,

out" Nixon.
I

(1)

2

do not think this example conclusively shows that

is inadequate.

English.

Let me introduce a new predicate into

We say, x is an F if x is a cow and Nixon exists.

Now consider the informal

English theory 'there are F's'

Given the meaning of 'F', this theory is, intuitively,

committed de re to Nixon.

But furthermore, there is nothing

wrong with representing this informal theory as the IIT
(T_,

I

^

lately defined.

acceptable for ^T,

^

If so,

then it is not obviously un-

to be committed de re to Nixon.

In fact Jubien's own criterion fails to accord with
this principle.
Let the sole non-logical axiom of T be
(Ex) (Ey) (xdy & (z) (Fz£-fr z=x v z=y) )
Define I by letting
aXh)='F(H) for every H and letting the extension of
F
be
{Nixon, Ford} in any world at which those two men exist and d
otherwise.
Then Jubien's criterion (5) implies that (T,
is committed de re to both Nixon and Ford.
Yet given that
\T
1.7 lacks the syntactic means of picking out either of
these men, Jubien's principle implies that /T, I) should not
N
be committed to either of these men.
.

'

'

’

'

I suggest the following criterion as according with
this principle.
(Of course, I do not endorse this criterion.)

(5')

/t,

i') is committed de re to x if
ij there is a theorem (E.'xyA of T and x is the unique
satisfier of A in every H at which <*T, I ) is true and
ii) for every y, if x is existentiairy dependent on
y, there is a theorem (E!x)B of T and y is the unique
satisfier of B in every H at which /T iy is true.
s

,

Clause ii) is added to deal with the problem with abstract
entities which motivates Jubien to move from his (4) to (5)
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In other words,

is an adequate

(T,

(I do

not claim

that it is the only adequate) formal representation of an in-

formal theory which has a de re commitment to Nixon.
it is not a conclusive objection to

<r.

is

Thus

that it implies that

(1)

committed de re to Nixon.

Let us say that the informal predicate

commitments.

'

F

'

hides

(A non-contrived example of such a predicate,

which was pointed out to me by Parsons is 'is British'.)
The example just considered then suggests a general answer
to the inflated domain objection to

(1)

.

The answer con-

sists in saying that any apparent inflated domain counter-

example to
is an

(1)

can be explained as involving a theory which

acceptable formal rendering of an informal theory which

has a predicate which hides commitments.

Note that both Jubien's criterion of de re commitment (5) and my revision of it (5')

not committed de re to Nixon.

imply that

<^T,

is

Thus Jubien must find some

other way of representing the informal theory 'there are
F's_'

There is no problem here (in this case, at least).

Roughly speaking, in order to apply Jubien's criterion,
this theory should be represented as an IIT whose axiom is

(Ex)Cx & (Ex) (x=n)
'n'

'

with

'C'

interpreted to mean cow and

treated as a name of Nixon.

The general maxim to

follow in representing informal theories which may involve

predicates which hide commitments if Jubien's criterion is
to be applied is to "reveal as much structure as possible".
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Thus we would represent 'Tom is British' by
first expanding
this theory to 'Tom bears R to Great Britain'

(where R is
whatever relation it is that someone bears to Great
Britain
if he is British) and then representing that
theory just as

you would think you would.

As we have seen, not all of the

structure of an informal theory need be revealed in
order
to apply (1).

^-^ion

s

criterion and

sults for a given IIT.

(1)

thus give different re-

In particular,

if

<^T,

p

is committed

de re to x according to Jubien's criterion then
(1)

that it is committed de re to

x,

implies

but the converse does not

hold in general.
The above remarks suggest, however,

that insofar as

what we are interested in is the commitments of informal
theories, then the differences between (1) and

may be unimportant.

(5)

((5'))

As noted earlier, we can view the pro-

cess of evaluating the commitments of an informal theory
as

consisting of two components.

First there is the trans-

lation component whereby the informal theory is rendered
as an IIT.

Then there is the criterion component whereby

the commitments of the formal theory are evaluated.
Iri

(1)

the example above, we have seen that pairing

with one translation procedure and pairing

(5)

with

another translation procedure give precisely the same results for the informal theory 'there are F's'.
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If what is taken to be important is
the evaluation

of the commitments of. informal theories,
then is there

any interesting difference between

differences between

(1)

and

(5)

(1)

and (5)?

Or do the

cancel out (in the case of

informal theories) because different translation
procedures
can be used in applying these criteria?

would be impossible to answer this question
affirmatively until we bad specified the respective
It

trans-

lation procedures more carefully.

There may, however, be

reason to answer this question negatively if we
assume that
any IIT is a countable theory.
Then it is an easy consequence of the Lowenheim-Skolem theorem that

(5) implies that
no IIT is committed de re to more than countable
many things.

(This is even more obvious in the case of (5').)

However,

an IIT could have a de re commitment to uncountably
many
things according to (1)
Thus,

if there is an informal theory (someone might

think that set theory is an example) which has a
de re com-

mitment to each of uncountable many things (not just
a commitment to there being uncountably many things)
then
,

there

will be no way of representing this theory as an
IIT and
then applying (5) to gain the result that this IIT is
com-

mitted de re to uncountably many things.

There is no

a priori obstacle to gaining this result
with (1)
It is my suspicion that this is the only
interesting
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difference between

(1) and

concerning informal theories.

(5)

For the time being, however,

I

want to limit myself to the

fairly modest claim that Jubien's objection to

(1) is not
conclusive if we limit our consideration to IIT's
defined

relative to the model structure we have defined; by
regarding certain IIT's as renderings of informal
theories

wmch

have predicates which hide commitments we can explain

why the apparent inflated domain counterexamples to

(1)

need

not be regarded as genuine counterexamples.
I

ment.

thus propose (1) as a criterion of de re commit-

besides the fact that it is in some sense the most

obvious criterion and also that it is not vulnerable to
in-

flated domain counterexamples,

adopting

(1)

I

have another reason for

In what follows, we will be concerned with

.

evaluating the commitments of certain formal theories.
will,

We

largely be concerned with showing that these theories

do not have certain commitments.
as has been noted,

By applying (1) which is,

a more liberal criterion than. (5)

is

when applied outright to formal theories we make the claim
that uhese formal theories do not have certain commitments
less controversial.

criterion cuan
.mat

(5)

(or

(I

would claim that any more liberal

(1.)

is

clearly too libera.1.)

))

j.s

adequate,

(a

If one thinks

then it should be applied

and it will be seen that if an IIT is not committed to x

according to
to

(5)

(1)

((5')).

,

then it is not committed to x according

Thus,

there are purely strategic reasons for
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accepting

(1) for the purposes of the work to be
pursued

here
I

also propose that (2) be accepted as the
criterion

of commitment to kinds.

What about de dicto commitment?
Given the way we have proceeded thus far, it
is natural to
regard de dicto commitment as a relation between
an IIT and
an individual property.
(An individual property is a property which is exemplified by at most one thing
at any world.)
Following the line suggested by (1) and
(2), we then say
(3)

p

(T,
is committed de dicto with respect to
an individual property P if P is exemplified
at every world at which
is true.
,

It

is important to note how (3)

of a world.

1^

depends on our definition

On our definition, relative to a language L

we can speak of the kinds that are exemplified
at a world

and also of the properties expressed by the primitive
predicates of L at a world.

On the basis of this we can ask,

for example, whether the individual property:

being the

unique thing w hich is not-P and of kind K (if P

which is expressed by some predicate of

L)

is

a property

is

exemplified

at a world.

Extending

(1)

,

(2)

and (3) to AIL'

s

and MAIL'S

Given the intensionality of ontological commitment,

.

in order

to assess the ontological commitments of
theories inter-

pieted as AIL's or as MAIL's, we need to provide intensional
versions of AIL's and MAIL's.

Once this is done,

(1),

(2)

51

and (3) apply immediately.

Whereas an AIL is interpreted by a
set of (extensional) structures, an intensional
AIL (IAIL) is interpreted
by a set of intensional structures
in the sense of
intensional structure’ defined at the outset
of
'

this chapter.

Thus an IAIL is an ordered pair
(l,

order language and
for L.

$

is a set of

$N

Then,

where L is

(h, $^>

$> is an IAIL.

is true at H if it is true in
1(H)

for example,

a first

intensional interpretations

An IAIT is an ordered pair ^T,

first order theory and <L,
<^L,

$}

where T is a

A sentence of
for every

I

in

$.

a IAIL is committed de re to
Nixon if

Nixon exists at every world at which
the theory is true.
The definition of an I MAIL will be
given in Chapter 4'.
Finally,

in later chapters we will be interested
in

asking how many things

a

theory is committed to existing.

We give a criterion for this as follows.-

T is committed

to there being a-many things off
in every world at which T
is

true at least a-many things exist.
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CHAPTER III
We now consider the consequences of interpreting

mathematical theories as certain kinds of IAIT's.
in Chapter One,

As noted

in so doing we will be investigating' the

consequences of interpreting mathematical theories in the

way that Benacerraf and Field suggest.

The motivating in-

tuition behind the approach to be studied here and in Chapter Four is that a structure is acceptable for interpreting
a

mathematical theory if it has the correct "structural"

properties.

A mathematical theory is not the theory of one

such structure in particular.

It will be the business of

Chapters Five and Six to clarify and attempt to support
this intuition.

Unless a formal theory of mathematical

truth could be constructed which embodied this intuition,
however, this intuition would be of little value.

It is to

such formal matters that we now turn.
(A)

Consider a first order language L for arith-

metic whose sole predicate is the two-place predicate
(the successor relation)

.

'S'

We provide this language with an

interpretation according with the intuition noted above.
In other words, we want to define a set

$

of acceptable

intensional interpretations such that the IAIL <f.
tures the intuition in question.

$)

cap-

To do this we give neces-

sary and sufficient conditions for an intensional inter-

pretation of be a member of

$.
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An acceptable structure for arithmetic is, roughly,
an omega-progression.

tion

I_

An acceptable intensional interpreta-

for L is then one in which for any world H (1) if

there are only a finite number of things which exist at
]i(H)-^r(H)

(2)

;

H,

if there are infinitely many things which

exist at H, 1(H) is isomorphic to the "standard model" of

L.

The effect of (1) is that if there are not enough

things at H to form the domain of an extensional interpreta-

tion of L which has the correct structural properties, then
is given the null interpretation.

S.

pretation,

Sxy

is false for every assignment of members

to the domain of 'x'

From

(1)

Given such an inter-

and

'

y'

and (2) it follows that if Ie$,

if there are only finitely many things at H.

I (H) =

<^T

(H)

picks out an omega-progression at H if there are enough
things at H.
The "standard model" of L is simply the model whose

domain is the set of natural numbers and whose assignment
is the successor relation defined on the natural

'S'

numbers
Having now specified
(t.
1^

a

»>

is true at a

member of

$.

we say that a sentence of

world H if it is true in every 1(H) for
Conditions (1) and (2) together guarantee

that' for every H ,( for every
I' (H)

$,

,

1^'

,

1(H)

is

?£>

Roughly speaking,

the idea is that an acceptable intensional interpretation

to

;

isomorphic to

so that if a sentence of true in some 1(H)

it is true
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m

any

I' (H)

Thus,

.

in all the 1(H) 's,

defining falsehood at H as falsehood

every sentence will be either true or

false at every world.

(Of course some sentences could be

true at one world and false at another.)

There are no in-

determinate sentences.
(B)

This technique may also be applied to the
case

of set theory.

Consider a formal language L whose sole

predicate is the two-place predicate
this language with a set

$

'

e'.

We aim to provide

of acceptable intensional inter-

pretations such that the resulting IAIL captures
the intuition
that set theory is not the study of one
particular structure,
but of what all structures which meet certain
conditions

have in common.
Two difficulties confront the attempt to define

First of all, for each

I

in

$

Hence the domain of 1(H) will be a set.
is no set of all
^E(H)

$.

and H, 1(H) will be some set.
But (in ZF) there

sets and thus it seems that the domain of

cannot contain all the sets.

Thus it seems that it is

impossible to give an interpretation of L in this way
which
captures the intention of set theory to speak of all sets.
This is a quite general difficulty which confronts
the attempt to provide a formal semantics for set theory.
It piesents no special problem for our approach.

What it

indicates is that formally we may not be able to give the

"intended interpretation" of set theory, but only a model
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wlu_ch reflects that

intended interpretation.

We proceed

with that qualification on what we do
The second difficulty concerns possible
structural

indeterminacy in set theory.

In the case of arithmetic,

by contrast, it is generally thought that
we have a clear
idea of the notion of a standard model of
arithmetic.
Such
a model must be isomorphic to the vonNeumann
model of arith-

metic

.

Given' differing conceptions of sets and possible

unclarities within

given conception of sets, it is not at

a

all clear that any two acceptable extensional
interpretations

must be isomorphic.

In one such interpretation the GCH

might be true, while in another it might be false.

One such

interpretation might even contain another as a set in its
domain
Once again,

this is a general problem which presents

no special difficulty for the approach taken here.

specifying

$

In

we will in effect take a position on the ques-

tion of structural indeterminacy, but other positions
on
this question can be accommodated within this approach.

We

will consider two such positions.
First, we take the radical position that there is
no indeterminacy in set theory.

inaccessible cardinal
C

K’

}

{<^x,

Let C= {x|rank x <the first

£>

rank
|

x,

rank v <

K'

& xey}

thus is the model of set theory which consists of the sets
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of rank less than the first inaccessible cardinal.

say that an intensional interpretation

of

$

of L is a member

I

if for any H (1) if there are fewer than R(K'

which exist at

H,

I (H) = <Y (H)

;

than R(K') things which exist at H,

Given this definition of
tions of 'true' and 'false'
true or false in every H.

)

things

if there are not fewer

(2)

tf);

Then we

1(H)

is isomorphic to C.

and our customary defini-

$

every sentence of L will be
(As before,

however, a sentence

could be true at one world and false at another.)
A second, more liberal, definition of
be a member of

$

if for any

many things which exist at

’H

allows

I

to

if there are only finitely

(1)

I(H)=<T (H)

H,

$

;

4y>;

(2)

if there

are infinitely many things which exist at H, then 1(H) is a

model of ZF.

On this definition,

the GCH,

for example,

would be neither true nor false at any world at which there
are infinitely many things.

In this case truth coincides

with provability.
(c)

An interpretation can also be provided for a

combined arithmetic and set theory.
tion has the predicates

The language in ques0

'S'

(

'

is a set'),

successor of'), and 'N'('is a number').

terpretation

I

is

a member of $ if

'e',

'S' ('is the

An intensional in-

(the following condition

employs the second method for interpreting set theory just
noted) for any H (1)

which exist at

H,

(if

then

there are only finitely many things
I^(H) =

^ (H)

;

> , <t>
<t

,

<t>

,

(2)

if there
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are infinitely many things which exist at H, then

I(H)=^F(H); A; B;

where ^A,

C;

is

isomorphic to the

standard model of arithmetic and where ^C, D) is a model
of ZF.

Many sentences are neither true nor false relative
to this interpretation (at worlds at which there are in-

finitely many things).

First of all, the GCH and, more

generally, any sentence which is also a sentence of ZF and

which is independent in ZF will be neither true nor false
(at any such world)

More interestingly, many sentences

.

which "mix" arithmetical and set theoretical language will
neither true nor false.
is

'

neither true nor false.

0=0

'

abbreviates a sentence which

The reason for this is that,

to speak for the moment as though

language
I

and

$

L,

'O'

and

'

0'

'O'

and

'0'

are in the

get assigned the same thing by some

and different things by other

I

and

$.

The truth

value of such sentences as '0=0' will be the major topic
of discussion in Chapter Five and it will be seen that the

fact that on the interpretation provided here '0=0'

is

neither true nor false (once again, at worlds at which there
are infinitely things) may be an important consideration
in favor of viewing this interpretation as the correct in-

terpretation of arithmetic plus set theory.
(D)

This approach may also be used to interpret the

languages appropriate for stating theories of impure sets.

Such a language might contain, for example, the predicates
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z

(

'

§.

>

a set')

is.

and

'A'

sn intensional interpretation
of

$

if for any H (1)

(is an apple').
X

of this language is a member

if there are only finitely many

things which are non-apples and which exist at
I

dO=<X (H)

;

<t>

H,

the set of things which are apples at H^,

;

if there are infinitely many non-apples which exist at

(2)

then I(H) =

H,

We say that

apples at

<k

(H)

,

;

A;

B;

the set of things which are

where 1(H) is a model of ZFA.

ZFA is the

theory obtained for ZF by adding the axiom
(Ex) (Sx & (y) (yaxe>Ay)) an d rewriting the axioms of ZF by

replacing each occurrence of a universal quantifier
.

.

.

(x)

.

.

.

by

.

..

.

(x)

(Sx.--^

...)'.

quantifiers have been eliminated.

(We assume existential
)

This theory allows some

(even all) apples to be sets, but not all sets can be

apples

;

hence we have the requirement that there are

infinitely many non-apples.
(E)

(D)

also illustrates that this approach

has no difficulty dealing with "mixed theories".

In terms

of the notion of partial signification, we can say that a

theory is mixed if some of its predicates partially signify
more than one extension and others partially signify more
than one extension.

Intuitively, a mixed theory is one which

contains some mathenitttical and some non-mathematical
vocabulary.

In (D)

'e'

partially signifies more than one

extension (at a world), while

'A'

partially signifies
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exactly one extension (at a world)
In general,

predicate
theory

,

P
'

'

to interpret mixed theories,

if a

does not, according to our philosophical

partially signify more than one extension (in the

informal theory in which it is used), then for every
in

$,

I,

I'

1(H) assigns the same extension to the predicate
which

represents

P

as does

I_'

predicates may vary form
It

is

(H)

.

I to

The assignments to other
I'.

significant that this approach handles mixed

theories so easily.

In giving a theory of mathematical

truth, we must account not only for the truth of pure

mathematical theories, but also applied mathematical theories,

e.g.

theories such as physics.

Such mixed theories

create important problems ror the approach to be considered
in the next chapter.

Furthermore it is crucial that such

theories be interpreted.
The general approach towards the problem of inter-

preting mathematical theories to be considered in this chapter should now be clear.

It is an important question to

ask whether the interpretations we have given these formal

languages should be regarded as giving an account of the

associated informal languages.

In giving an interpretation

for the language whose sole predicate is

'S',

have we given

an account of the informal language whose sole predicate
is "is the successor of'?
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One way of beginning to answer this
question is to

ask whether this interpretation gives the
correct truth

values to sentences.

The answer to this, at least in the
case of arithmetic, the case of set theory being
less clear
given the possible problem of structural indeterminacy
is,

Yes

On the other hand, there are many other ways
of in-

terpreting mathematics (e.g. interpretations in set
theory)

which also apparently give correct truth values.
tion which then arises is

:

The ques-

why prefer one method of inter-

preting theories to another (provided these methods agree
on truth values)?

Does it even make sense to speak of one,

rather than another, being the correct account?
there to choose between such accounts?

What is

In large part,

questions are the business of Chapters Five and Six.

such
How-

ever, here we may note that although two methods may agree

on the distribution of truth values, but differ in the

ontological commitments they imply a theory has.
Thus we now turn to consider what the ontological

commitments of mathematical theories are relative to inter-

preting them as IAIT's as discussed in this chapter.
To the IAIL defined in (A) above we add the following

axioms to obtain an IAIT.
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Sxy

"

(1)

(E.'x) (y)

(2)

(x)(E!^) Syx

(3)

(x) (y) (z)

(

1) —

(

3)

(

Sxy & Sxz —> y=z)

together guarantee that there are infinitely

many "numbers".

We can now discuss the ontological commit-

ments of this theory.
I

claim that

(i)

this theory T has no de re commit-

ments and (ii) T is not committed to the kind abstract

entity

.

To take (i)

first (which is,

I

think,

intuitively,

clearly true) is there some thing which exists at every word
at which T is true?

This amounts to the question whether

there is some thing, such that in any world at which it does

not exist only finitely many things exist.

(The existence

of infinitely many things is sufficient for there to be

acceptable interpretations of this theory and T is true in
all such interpretations.)

It is clear that there is no

such thing given the notion of a world defined in Chapter
Two

Now consider whether T is committed de re to something

x.

(Again,

intuitively, there is no such thing.)

We

have just said that there is a world H at which there are

infinitely many things and x does not exist.
each such world.
Two,

T is true in

Thus by the criterion developed in Chapter

T has no de re- commitments.

The reader should note

here, that we are relying in a substantive way in this
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argument on the notion of

a

world which has been defined.

If it is thought that in some sense
the notion of a world

we defined is

inappropriate for evaluating commitments,

this result would not follow.

Note, however,

tively T has no de re commitments.

that intui-

Thus any correct criterion

of de re commitment should imply this.

We may also view

this as confirmation of the theory of
commitment stated in

Chapter Two.
(ii)

There is a world at which there are no abstract

entities and there are infinitely many concrete
entities.
Let H be such a world.

In H each I in

$

picks out a struc-

ture isomorphic to the standard model of arithmetic
(the

domains of which structures consist solely of concrete
entities).

T is true in each such structure;

hence it is

true in a world at which no abstract entities exist.

Hence,

by our criterion of commitment for IAIT's, T is not
com-

mitted to the kind abstract entity

.

We could say that a theory in nominalistic if
(1)
it is not committed de re to any entity which is
abstract

and

(2)

it is not committed to the kind abstract entity

.

(Recall that on our theory of commitment (2) does not imply
(1)

although we did consider a modification of our theory

which would have had that result if we assume that any abstract entity is essentially abstract.)

A program of

nominalism in mathematics would then be successful if every
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mathematical theory could be interpreted
so as to satisfy
and
(1)
(2)
Nominalism need not be understood in.
this way
.

(in fact in Chapters Five and Six
platonism (non-nominalism)
will be understood in a different way
as the claim that

mathematical constants refer to abstract
entities) but I
think this characterization does
capture at least part of
what nominalism in mathematics has
been taken to mean.
In this sense

claim that both arithmetic and set

I

theory, as here interpreted, are nominalistic.

This then
raises the interesting possibility that
if informal arithmecic and informal set theory (in some
sense) should be
interpreted in this way, that both of these
theories are

nominalistic
It is relatively clear how these results
are ob-

tained.

Roughly speaking, we allow anything at all
to be
the '«$' of an acceptable structure for set
theory.
In other
words, we interpret
as partially denoting everything.
'

<z5

'

In such a way there is no one thing or kind
of thing which

must exist in order for
is

'

exists'

to be true.

Something
mildly puzzling here, however, since in interpreting

arithmetic and set theory as we have we have used
both set
theory and arithmetic, in our metalanguage. A
suspicion may
arise here that this shows that a general program
of nominalism in mathematics cannot be carried through in
this way
for the reason that our meta-theory has non-nominalistic
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commitments.
tion,
Two,

This issue arises throughout this
disserta-

for example,

in our definition of a world in
Chapter

but perhaps most obviously in

(A)

above where

.we

"re-

ferred to" the standard model of arithmetic
in specifying
the interpretation of a language.
This same issue arises
Chapter Four, where it is argued that this
suspicion is
incorrect

m

A second important objection to the approach
taken
here is as follows.

Since informal arithmetic has

'one

exists' as a theorem, informal arithmetic has
a de re com-

mitment to the number one.

Thus either our formal interpretation of informal arithmetic is inadequate or we
are incorrect

in claiming that this formal theory lacks de
re commitments.

Similar remarks could be made concerning commitment
to the
kind number
.

This is the same objection which was discussed in
the opening pages of Chapter One.

Our answer to it is that

it is not a priori untenable to hold that in
mathematics

there are

and

exists

are used in special ways:

ways

such that 'one exists' and 'there are numbers' do not have
^

commitment and a commitment to the kind number,

respectively.

A final, related, question concerns the applicability
of this technique of interpretation.

theory could be represented as an

I.AIT

Obviously any informal
in such a way that
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the resultant formal theory lacks de re
commitments.
is

This

disturbing in that it seems to open the door to holding

that no theory has de re commitments, which is,
perhaps, an

absurd result.
I

Much the same sort of thing bothered Quine,

believe, in his worry that the Lowenheim-Skolem theorem

showed that every theory could be reduced to a theory
of

numbers
In fact,

technique.
j-AIT.

Any informal theory can be represented as an

ihe question is,

represented.
ments.

interpreting theories as IAIT's is a general

however, whether they should be so

Presumably some theories do have de re commit-

Such theories should not be represented by formal

theories which lack such commitments.

Thus what is shown

in this chpater in no way indicates that arithmetic lacks

de re commitments.

That could only be established by

philosophical argument.

The semantical technique introduced

here only shows how mathematics might be represented.
On the other hand, although these theories have no
de re commitments and are nominalistic,

in another way

they do have quite heavy ontological commitments.
ample,

For ex-

the theory T of arithmetic has a commitment to there

being infinitely many things, in the sense that there are

infinitely many things in any world at which it is true.
Set theory,

of cours^, may have an even heavier commitment,

depending on how it is interpreted.

In particular,

on our

66

first interpretation given above,

it has a commitment to

there being inaccessibly many things.
But even though these theories have these commit-

ments,

they are nominalistic.

Can a general program of

nominalism in mathematics be thus carried through by interpreting mathematical theories as IAIT's?

We have already

noted one suspicion that it cannot, but in fact there is
an easier way of showing this program will not work.
If we consider just pure mathematical theories.

*

I

think it is clear that this program can be carried through.

Difficulties arise, however, in certain cases of mixed
theories

Consider the theory

.

whose non-logical axioms

T'

are the axioms of the theory T of arithmetic noted above

and the additional axiom (E!x)Cx (there is exactly one

concrete thing)

.

The interpretation of the language of

this theory is such that

I

is

in

$

if for any H (1)

if there

are only finitely many things which exist at H, then
I (H)

(H)

;

<t>\

the set of things which are concrete at

and (2) if there are infinitely many things which exist at
H,

then I(H)= 4(H)

;

A;

the set of things which are concrete

at H^> where A is isomorphic to the standard successor

relation defined on the natural numbers.
In any world H at which T'

is true,

there is only

one thing which is concrete at H, but there are infinitely
many_ things which exist at H.

Thus

T'

is committed to the
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kind abstract entity.

(Note that we are here relying
on

one of the requirements which we
placed on worlds in Chapter Two:
if something is not concrete,
it is abstract.)
- StiU does not have an y de re commitments to abstract
entities, but it is not nominalistic
(though it is nominalistic
the sense of Chapters Five and
Six in that it does
not construe mathematical constants
as names) and this

m

commitment is not due alone to the
non-mathematical
there is exactly one concrete thing'

theory which anyone is likely to hold.

examples are easy to find, however,

i.e.

part of T'

,

Now this example is unrealistic in
that
a

,

T'

is not

More realistic

If set theory is inter-

preted in the first way described above,
then that theory
plus the axiom 'there are only denumerably
many concrete
things
(represented in the obvious way as an IAIT) has
a
,

commitment to the kind abstract entity

.

An even simpler case is the theory ZFA if
we in-

terpret

'A'

as having as its extension at a world the
set

of concrete things at that world.
a set

ZFA then "says” there is

which contains all the concrete things and in any

world in which ZFA is true there are abstract
things (since
otherwise the domain of a model of ZFA would be a
member of
itself).

Thus an impure set theory which asserts the exist-

ence of a set containing all concrete entities
will be com-

mitted to the kind abstract entity

.

Thus not every
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mathematical theory can be shown to be nominalistic by
interpreting it as an I AIT.
This point has relevance to a claim of Field's

Field claims ([7]

220-1) that we can account for arith-

metical truth while holding that there are infinitely
many
physical objects but no abstract objects by interpreting

arithmetic in the way we have presented in this chapter.
We have seen that that claim is true,

We have also seen,

however, that we cannot account for mathematical truth in

general (counting mixed theories as mathematical theories)

while holding this view.

Thus the point about arithmetic

is only of limited interest.

Let us summarize the results of this chapter.

Mathematical theories, interpreted as IAIT's:
(1)

can lack de re commitments to abstract entities (even when they are not nominalistic)

(2)

can allow such problematic sentences as
to be neither true nor false;

(3)

have commitments to there being K things, for
some cardinal K;

(4)

are not, in general, nominalistic.

'0=<f>'
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CHAPTER

IV

In this chapter we investigate
the consequences

of interpreting mathematical
theories as IMAIT’s.

The pri-

mary consequences for pure
mathematical theories, so interpreted, are that if such theories
allow the formation of
sentences which combine mathematical
theories,
e.g.

'0=^',

then such sentences can be neither
true nor false and that
no such theory has an ontological
commitment to there being
at least one thing.
In other words, it is shown how
such
theories can be true in the empty
world.
(Note that given
the definition of a world given in
Chapter Two there is an
empty world.)
Two obvious corollaries of this second
consequence are that pure mathematical theories
(so interpreted)
are nominalistic (in the sense defined
in Chapter Three)
and that such theories have no de re
commitments.
This result should be of interest given widespread
scepticism concerning whether a nominalistic account of
mathematics is

possible
Most of the work of this chapter is concerned
with
extending this treatment of pure theories to mixed
theories.

Difficulties are encountered, but
found.

I

believe a solution is

The results for mixed theories could be
summarized

by saying that unless the non-mathematical
part of a mixed
theory is non-nominalistic the entire thoery
(interpreted
,

as an IMAIT)

is nominalistic.

More generally,

the only
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commitments of such a mixed theory are those of the non-

mathematical part of that theory.

Interpreting mathematical

theories as IMAIT's thus results in importantly fewer

ontological commitments than interpreting them as IAIT's.
Consider the theory T of arithmetic defined in Chapter

The axioms and interpretation

3.

$

remain as before.

All that we change to interpret this theory as an IMAIT are
the definitions of truth and falsehood.

Instead of saying that a sentence is true at a world
H if it is true in every 1(H)

for I in

it is true at H if for every world H'
1

‘yi

(H)

,

i£y

then H is true in

H if for every world H'

and

I

H
(
I

'

)

in

$,

and

we now say that
I

in

$

,

if I(H')^

A sentence is false at

.

$

if I(H_^)#<V

(H)^ then

it is false in I(H').

Some explanation would be helpful here.

The idea

is that a sentence is true just in case necessarily it is

true in every structure in which 'S' has an extension with
the "right" structure.

every

I

in

$

Given the way we have defined

and world H 1(H) either gives

'S'

$,

for

the null

extension or gives it an extension with the right structure,

that is, it assigns it an extension isomorphic to

the successor relation of the standard model of arithmetic.

By looking only at

I^(H)

'

s

where

'£>'

does not have the null

extension, we guarantte-e that we consider only the right

structures
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The reason why arithmetic, interpreted as an IMAIT
is not committed to there being at least one thing is clear.

Let H be the world at which nothing at all exists.

The

theory of arithmetic just defined is true at H, because its
axioms are true in every

I (H'

)

which is not identical with

Thus this theory is true at a world at which

nothing at all exists.

This implies that this theory is not

committed to there being at least one thing.
These results are straightforwardly applicable to

both set theory and the combined set theory-arithmetic

discussed above.

In each case the interpretation $ remains

as before and only the definitions of truth and falsehood

are changed.
Clearly, neither of these theories is committed to

there being at least one thing.

Furthermore, for the com-

bined set theory-arithmetic in which such sentences as
'0=0'

can be formed, such sentences can be neither true nor

false.

('0=0'

also.)

This method of interpreting mathematical theories

can also be interpreted to be true or false,

as IMAIT 's can be applied to any mathematical theory,

so

that we have now achieved what was promised in opening:

interpreting pure mathematical theories as IMAIT'

s

has

the counsequences that certain sentences which combine

mathematical languages can be taken to be neither true nor
false and that these theories so interpreted are not
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ontological ly committed to there being at least one thing.
As we have noted,

this latter consequence implies that such

theories have no de re ontological commitments and that such

theories are nominalistic.
Again,

it could be argued,

as it was in Chapters One

and Three that since 'there are numbers' has a commitment
to the kind number

,

either our representation of arithmetic

is inadequate or we are incorrect in holding that this

formal theory lacks a commitment to the kind number.
believe, however,

I

that this objection was answered in Chap-

ter One.

This modal interpretation of mathematics thus has

some interesting consequences.

However, if we attempt to

interpret theories which mix mathematical language with
language about ordinary concrete entities, difficulties
arise.

This difficulty concerning mixed theories might be

expected.

In giving a modal interpretation of mathematics,

we essentially look at all worlds to see whether a sentence
is

true at a world.

That does not create any difficulties,

because a true mathematical theory is necessarily true..
However, if we consider the truth value of a sentence about

concrete entities we definitely do not want to look at all
worlds to see if
roughly,

that;

sentence is true at a world H, for,

it is facts which are peculiar to H which make

this" sentence true.

l
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To see this in a particular case,

let us add to out

language of arithmetic the one-place predicates
(to be interpreted as meaning:

is a fish

and

'F'

'N'

and is a number,

respectively.) To give a modal interpretation of the resultant language we specify

and give a definition of truth.

$

An intensional interpretation
H,

(1)

is a member of $ if for any

if there are only finitely many members of y(H)

I(H) = {V(H) $
;

;

<t>

the set of things which are fish are

;

if there are infinitely many members of T (H)

(2)

A;

I

the set of things which are fish at

B;

,

H^and

1(H)

where

<(a,

(H)
E^>

is isomorphic to the standard model of arithmetic.

If we were to follow the general pattern of the

definition of truth for an IMAIT presented above, we would
say that a sentence of this theory is true at a world H if
for every H' and

in

I

$

,

things which are fish at
I (H

'

)

if I(H' )±

(H)

;

<t>

;

<t>

;

the set of

then that sentence is true in

H^>

.

This,

however, will not work.

something is a fish.

Then we want

H on this interpretation.
in which 'S'
?S.

^

(Ex)Fx'

'

proposed definition

)

'

,

'

(Ex)Fx'

(Ex)Fx'

'

F'

does get assigned

is false.

Thus, on the

is not true at H.

To solve this problem,
we,

to be true at

Unfortunately, for some I(H')

does not get assigned p,

In such an I (H

of structure

'

Suppose that at H,

let us think about what sort

would want to examine in defining truth of

a sentence of this

theory.

Suppose that

I

(H)=/y (H)

;

C;

D;

;
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the set of things which are fish at h).
be

?L>

($>,

might either

((c,

or isomorphic to the standard model of arithmetic.)

Tnen it appears that the sort of structure
we seek would
be of the form: <^D, A, B,
at 5/* where 1(H) e: D and

the set of things which are fish
is isomorphic to the stand-

<^A,

ard model of arithmetic.

Let us call such a structure an

acceptable structure relative to

H,

F

Then the definition

of truth at a world which we seek would be:
true at H if for every

I,

able structure relative to
in

I

(H

'

'

and H’

I'

1^,

if

I

'

(H

a sentence is
1

is an accept-

)

then that sentence is true

H,

)

The general idea here is to keep the extensions of
some predicates fixed.

bnund.
the

Let us call such predicates world-

The extensions of other predicates (essentially,

mathematical" ones) are allowed to vary.

cates we will call other - wor Idly

.

Such predi-

Then we also (in some

cases) need to consider a larger domain.

Now suppose that I(H) = ^{a,
other words,

is a

which is a fish.
true at H,

and

I,

b}

,

(a}V

H,

in

world at which two things exist, one of
It is now easy to see that

(E!x)Fx is

since in any acceptable structure relative to H

only a is in the extension of 'F'.
Note, however,

tl^iat

(E.'x)-Fx is false,

since in any

such acceptable structure there are infinitely many things

not in the extension of

F
'

'

This is neither surprising,

nor disturbing, since in order to make the mathematical
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sentences have the correct truth
values at H, we need to
have the sentence which says that
there are more than two
things come out true.
This fact does, however, point
out a certain lack
of expressive power of this language.
to be able to express

Somehow we would like

'there is a unique non-fish' by a

true sentence of this language,

since,

this sentence is clearly true at H.

in at least one sense

In fact,

done by adding a new world-bound predicate
language.

(

E
'

is

'E'

In every 1(H),

is equal to the domain of 1(H).

like an existence-predicate.

however,

to this

is supposed to suggest existence
for reasons

that will soon be made clear.)

sion of

'E'

this is easily

Since

E
’

'

the exten-

In this way it
is world-bound,

it keeps the same extension when we
move from 1(H)

to a structure acceptable relative to H,

I.

Then it is easy to see that (E.'x)(Ex &
at the two-thing world described above.

-

Fx)

In general,

is true

if we

want to speak only of what really exists at H we
relativize
the quantifiers to
E

language.

E
'

'

then adds important expressive powers to this
In general,

it may be useful to add such a

world-bound existence, predicate to the language used to
formalize mixed informal languages.
Note also that the sentences with only arithmetical

(other-worldly) predicates get the correct truth values.
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In any acceptable structure,

the assignment to

guarantees that, since that assignment ^A,

'N'

and

'S'

is isomorphic

B^>

to the standard model of arithmetic.

As for sentences which mix world-bound and other-

worldly predicates, consider
arranged things,

(*)

(x) (Fx

(*)

v Nx)

.

As we have

is neither true nor false at H.

The

reason for this is that in some acceptable structures the

extension of

will be the domain of the structure, while

N

in other acceptable structures there are things which are

neither in the extension of
(“)

'F'

nor in the extension of

is a natural formalization of

a number'.

As such,

N
'

'

'everything is a fish or

it seems not unreasonable that

(*)

is

neither true nor false, but note that by slight and obvious

modifications of the definition of an acceptable structure
different results could be obtained.

For example, by re-

quiring the domain of an acceptable structure relative to
the world H above be {a, b}

could be true at

finitions both

H.

(x)

true nor false.

easily obtained.

the extension of 'N'

(*)

Note also that on both of these de-

(Ex—^ Nx) and

(x) (Fx — ^ Nx)

are neither

Once again, however, different results are
This is desirable,

since the truth values

of sentences which mix mathematical with non-mathematical

sentences are often difficult to ascertain.
text,

I

In this con-

am more interested in exhibiting a general tech-

nique which can be accommodated to any philosophical stand
on these questions, rather than actually taking a stand on

.
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these questions.
This distinction we have made
between world bound

and other-worldly predicates,
though useful as far as it
goes, is not, however, adequate
for dealing with all mixed
languages.
Consider 'has at least
brothers'.

This is

predicate which, intuitively, is non-pure
at its first
place and pure at its second place.
Let us call such predicates mixed and adopt the convention
of speaking of
a

the places
of mixed predicates as being either
pure or non-pure
In
giving a definition of a mixed theory
we will want to make
certain requirements on how the mixed
predicates are interpreted, just as we put conditions on
how the world-bound
predicates are interpreted.
.

Suppose for the sake of illustration that
we are

dealing with a language having predicates

N
’

B

,

to be interpreted as meaning is a number,

of and has^ at

east
;

N;

S;

B^)

and

is a successor

brothers, respectively.

l_

that I(H) = <T(H)

'S',

'

Suppose

where N is the extension of

'

N

'

etc.

,

What sort of a structure do we want to consider
in
defining truth at H of a sentence of this language?
Such a
structure will be of the form ^D, N'
S'; B^> where T(H)«D
;

and <N'
metic.

;

SVis isomorphic

to the standard model of arith-

What requirements do we want to put on

following appear to be minimal requirements.

B

'

?

The
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This is intended to capture the
idea that
at its first place.
Also, note that 'B(x,

sentences of this language.

1)'

H,

I,

is

non-pure

abbreviates certain open

Roughly speaking, we would like

to guarantee that if x satisfies

structure relative to

’B'

'B(x,

1)'

in one acceptable

then it satisfies 'B(x, 1)’

every acceptable structure relative
to

H,

I.

We implement this requirement as
follows.

say that 'Py'
tures if

is

its only free variable,

and '(E.'y)Py' holds in every member
of

and ’S')

'N'
Q.

Then we require:

if in some acceptable structure
S relative to H,
is an M-sentence

in

there

I,

relative to the set of acceptable

'Py'

structures relative to
B

g of struc-

it contains only

other-worldly predicates (in this case,

tension of

Let us

is an M- sentence relative to
a set

’y'

in

H,

I,

such that

<^t,

y^>

in the ex-

is

and y satisfies ‘Py’ in S, then there is
M-sentence ’P*y‘ relative to the set of acceptable
struc'

'

S

tures relative to H,

I,

such that y satisfies ’Py’

and every acceptable structure
is a z satisfying

fies

B
'

'

’P*y’

in S'

S’

relative to

I

there

z^>

satis-

H,

and such that (x,

in S

in S'.
The idea here is that if ^x,
y) satisfies

'B'

in

some acceptable structure and
y satisfies an M-predicate,

then there is some M-predicate which picks out correlates
of y in every acceptable structure including
y itself in
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the given structure.

Let us move from these examples to a
general defini-

tion of a mixed

I MAIL.

(In fact, pure IMAIL's can be under-

stood essentially as special cases of mixed
IMAIL's, so
this is a perfectly general definition.)
A mixed I MAIL is
an ordered triple (L, $,
where L is a first order language
and $ is a set of intensional interpretations
of L.
We

assume an exhaustive and mutually exclusive
division of

predicates into the categories world - bound
worldly.

mixed and other-

,

Furthermore, we assume a specification of which

places of the mixed predicates (if any) are pure and
which
are non-pure.

£ then

is

a

three-place function which takes an

intensional interpretation

I,

a world H and a world H'

into

the set of structures whose domains are a subset of
y (H

and which are acceptable relative to H,

'

I.

In general, we require
g to satisfy the following

conditions.

If

S

is a

member of the domain of G(I,

H,

H')

then
(i)

the domain of 1(H) is a subset of the
domain of S;

(ii)

the extension of any world-bound predicate
is the same in 1(H) as it is in S;

(iii)

for any^jnixed predicate 'P n

of g(I, H, H'),

if <a

of the extension of
(a)

if

i

L

,

.

n
'

'

.

.

,

and member

'

in S

,

a non-pure place of 'P

S

is a member

a^

then
n
,

then a. is
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member of the domain of 1(H)
If for each i. which is a pure place
n
of 'P ',
satisfies a predicate
a

;

)

which is an M-predicate relative
H )
then there are
51>
predicates 'P*' relative to
'P.

'

t0 vJ
H^eK
g(I, H,

H')

P*' in S

'

g,(I,

<^bp

M.>
•

•

•

’

,

(J^^ K
such that a^ satisfies

and for any

S'

in

M'), there is an n-tuple
b^> which satisfies
Pn'.in
'

,

S_'

such that if

in

'P

n

i is

a non-pure place

then £u=b^ and if

,

place,

'

then b^ satisfies

i
'

P*

is a pure
'

in S'.

A sentence then is true at H if it is true in every

member of

H,

g,(I,

H'

)

.

That is,

it is true at H if

it is true in every acceptable structure relative to H.

A

sentence is false if it is false in every member of
£(I. H, H').
To test this definition, we interpret an impure

set theory as a mixed IMAIT.

To obtain such a theory we

relativize each of the axioms of ZF to

a

predicate

'S'

('is a set') and then add axioms asserting the existence of

impure sets.

In this case we add the sole axiom

(Ex) (Sx & (y) (yex

Cx)

)

.

(The set of concrete things

exists.)
To interpret this theory as an IMAIT we specify the
set
$

1

$

of interpreting <Lntensional interpretations.
'

if for every world H (1)

I

is in

if there are only finitely many
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non-concrete things which exist at

H,

then I(H)=<J(H);

the set of things which are concrete at h);

(2)

</>,

</>;

if there

are infinitely many non-concrete things which exist at H,

then l.(H)=^4'(H)

;

A;

the set of things which are concrete

B;

where A is the extension of

at

’

Sj

and where 1(H) is a

model of the impure set theory just stated.
We then treat
'

and

e'

'S'

'C'

as a world-bound predicate and

as other-worldly in order to specify g.

In

specifying g we will be saying what an acceptable structure
relative to H, I is.
say that g(I, H, H
that

S

is

'

)

In general,

is the set of S=x' ;y'

a model of this theory,

For example,

if I(H) = /x;

xcx'c.I(H'

if I(H)=^{a, b }

acceptable structure relative to

H,

;

I

<z$

;

0

z

;

;

)

y_;

'

;

we

z;
t'

and t=t

such
'

.

(a^ then an

will be of the form

where this structure is a model of this
theory and

(a,

b} e; D.

By our definition, we have guaranteed that each of
the axioms of this theory will be true at the world H just

described (under the given interpretation)
theory will be true at every world.
is

true at H is

(E!x)Cx.

we have seen above.

E'

In fact that

Another sentence which

(Elx)-Cx is false for the reason

We could adequately express 'there is

a unique non-concrete thing'
'

.

as described above-r

by adding an existence predicate

(x) (Cx

both- neither true nor false.

v Sx) and

(x) (Cx

—^ Sx) are
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Clearly,

this theory can be true under this
inter-

pretation at a world with any number of
things.
Thus this
theory is not committed to there being
more than one thing.
This technique can be applied generally
to impure
set'

theories,

so that we have the result that not
only can inter

preting pure set theories as IMAIT’s yield
theories without
commitments to pure sets, also interpreting
impure set

theories as mixes IMIAT’s

ments to any sets.

yield

theories without commit-

To take the crucial case,

if rather than

adding an axiom asserting the existence of the set
of concrete things to our modified ZF, we had added an
axiom

asserting the existence of the unit set of Frege, the resultant theory would have these commitments:
(1)

a commitment de re to Frege;

(2)

a commitment to there being at least one thing;

but not
(3)

a commitment de re to the unit set of Frege;

(4)

a commitment to there being at least two things

These points have relevance both to the scope of the

method of interpretation developed here and to the work of
Michael Jubien in this area.

In a forthcoming paper

[14]

and in published work [12] Jubien presents a theory of

mathematical truth which is close to that stated here.

Al-

though his treatment oiljcombined and mixed mathematical
theories is different from ours, it is not too inaccurate
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to say that he proposes that mathematical theories
be inter-

preted as IMAIT's.

He then correctly draws the inference

that under this interpretation pure mathematical
theories

have no de re commitments.
On the other hand, he makes an assumption that im-

plies that de re commitments to contain impure sets are
possible.

Apparently, he believes that although we can inter-

pret pure matnematical theories in such a way that they have
no de re commitments,

it is not possible to interpret impure

set theories in this way.

The reason he thinks this is quite clear.
f ining an

In de-

interpretation for impure set theory, in our meta-

language we are constantly "speaking of" impure sets, e.g.
each 1(H) is an impure set.

It is apparently this

fact

which Jubien has in mind in thinking that he needs to assume
that de re commitments to impure sets are possible.

This is an important problem which arises throughout this work.

It arose in Chapter Three when we wondered

whether interpreting mathematical theories as IAIT's could
be used as the means of carrying out a general program of

nominalism.

At that point we defereed discussion of this

problem, so

that What follows is intended also to answer

this objection as it arose in Chapter Three.

Where does this supposed commitment lie?

It does

not lie with the object language impure set theory which is
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to bo int erpre 1 e d

,

for we have

SG6n that we have 3 way of

interpreting this theory relative to which this theory has
no de re commitments to sets.

It can only be then that the

meta-theory in which this theory is given has commitments
Whether it does though depends on how this meta-

to sets.

theory is interpreted (in a meta-meta- language)

.

The ques-

tion then is how to interpret the impure set theory which
is part of the meta-theory.

Our answer to this is clear:
set theory as an IMAIT.

interpret that impure

On such an interpretation the meta-

theory will be seen to have no commitment to sets (de re
or otherwise) despite the fact that it does "speak of" sets.

Just as although the object- language theory "speaks of"

impure sets, but has no commitments to sets, so too for the

meta- language

.

To sum up, the situation is this:

no matter

what level we are talking at, it will appear that our talk
has platonistic commitments; by ascending to a meta-language
(with its apparent commitments) we show how to escape this

result.
This seems to underline an important aspect of our

approach to nominalism.

It might be thought that the only

way of establishing nominalism would be to provide translations of, say, arithmetic into some chosen nominalistic
language.

Such has (been the approach of many in this field.

For us, by contrast, nominalism is not a question
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translation, but of interpretation.

On our approach,

the nominalist can feel perfectly free to use "platonistic"

language without being able to eliminate this language.

All

that he needs to do is to give an interpretation of this

language relative to which this theory is not committed to
numbers,

sets,

etc.

In this chapter we have seen how this

can be done.
Just as in Chapter Three, the question of applica-

bility arises here.
as an IMAIT.

Any informal theory could be represented

Have we thus opened the door to holding that

no theory is committed to there being anything at all?

Once

again, it is one thing to show that a theory could be

represented as an IMAIT and quite another to hold that it
ought to be so represented.

There is some plausibility,

I

believe, to holding that, say, set theory could be true
in the empty world.

Part of this plausibility derives

from the idea that set theory would be true
what and that there might be nothing at all.
set theory,

so to speak,

facts about, any world.

no.

matter

The truth of

does not depend on any particular

Hence it is true in the empty world.

The truth of some non-mathematical theories, e.g.

'there

are horses' does depend on particular facts about a given
world.

Hence such theories are not generally true in the

empty world, are not true no matter what and so should not
be represented by theories which would be true in the empty

86

world.

Thus

,

I

am quite confident that the work of this

chapter cannot be used as a means of arguing that no theory
has any commitments.

A bit of clarification concerning the categories of
predicates would be helpful

Roughly speaking, the other-worldly

.

predicates will be those which can appear in pure mathematical
theories.

The world-bound predicates are those which can

appear in theories which do not contain any mathematics at
all.

The mixed predicates are the other predicates.

They

are predicates which can only appear in theories' having a

mathematical and a non-mathematical component.
ever,

Note, how-

that this is only a rough characterization since,

example, this characterization allows

'='

for

to be both a world-

bound and an other-worldly predicate.
To be more precise,

consider an arbitrary place of

an arbitrary primitive predicate.

Consider whether we want

to guarantee that any satisfier (at H) of that place must

actually exist (at H)

.

If so,

and if this holds also for

any other place of that predicate, then we will classify
the predicate as being world-bound.

If this does not hold

for any place, the predicate is other-worldly.

predicates are mixed.

All other

The places of a mixed predicate for

which the above condition does held are the non-pure places
(

of that predicate.

The other places are the pure places.

Note that on this characterization

worldly predicate.

Note also that (as

'='

'='

is an other-

shows)

that the
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satis fier
H)

,

\,at

H)

of an other-worldly predicate may exist

Those predicates are other-worldly only in the

sense that their satisfiers need not exist.

Finally, it is

possible that for certain purposes a finer set of classifiCcitions of predicates xvould be needed.

It is clear,

however,

that the given classification is exhaustive and mutually

exclusive
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CHAPTER
In a well-known paper

V
Paul Benacerraf has argued,

[2]

"there are no things as numbers"

73).
( [2
Benacerraf proceeds in arguing for this conclusion by
first arguing that
]

:

numbers are not sets ([2]: 57-8); then he
"extends" this
argument to show that numbers are not anything
at all

([2]:

69-70).
In arguing that numbers are not sets,
he asks the

question, of all the set-theoretic models of
number theory
is there one which is identical with
the "intended" model
of number theory, i.e. the model whose domain
consists of
0,

1,

etc.?

2,

For example,

if we let

the successor of a set x be x(J{x}
metic.

Is 0 then identical

with

,

'O'

denote

i

and let

we get a model of arithOr is it one of the

tf?

other sets which is the denotation of

'O'

in a model of

arithmetic?

Benacerraf says,
if there exists.
a "correct" account, do there
also exist arguments which will show it to be the
correct one? Or does there exist a particular set
of sets b, which is really the numbers, but such
that there exists no argument one can give to establish that it.
is really the numbers?
It
seems altogether too obvious that this latter pos^-t^-tl-^-ty borders^ on the absurd.
If the numbers
constitute one particular set of sets, and not
another, then there must be arguments to indicate
which ( 2] 57-8)
.

.

.

.

f

.

:

Just what is the argument?

abbreviate

it can be shown that

'

Let us use

and

S
'

'

'*'

to

to abbreviate
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'

is a set

'

Nov Benacerraf's premises could
perhaps be expressed
as follows.
(1)

S(0)-4 (Ex)(Sx & *(x=0.))

(2)

-

(3)

-

(1)

set,

(Ex) (Sx & *(x=0))

S(0)

is a

rendering of the principle that if

0

is a

then there is a set x such that it can
be shown that

is x.

(2) simply says that there is no such

How does Benacerraf argue for (2)?

0

x.

He considers

the logrcist account of numbers which
says that 0=(d} and
argues that there is no reason to believe that
it is true
([2]

58-62).

:

Then he says that when this is seen, it is

clear that there is no reason to believe that any
other

set-theoretic account of
(and what

I

(4)

0

is true.

Thus what he has argued

am willing to accept is that
-*(a=0)

is true whenever a is replaced by any standard
name

of a set.

)

(e.g.

But this does not show that (2) is true.

Suppose (4) is true for any such

a.

Even so, it could be

true that
(5)

since
(2)

,

,

'O'

S(0) & *(0=0)
~

.

is not a

standard name of a set.

If (5)

is

true,

is false.

In arguing that both (2) and (5) and also (15) and
(18)

below are contradictories,

I

assume that the inference
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from *(

0

.

.

..)

.

to

(Ex* (

that inference is valid.

.

.

.

x ...) is valid.

I

think that

For example, we would accept the

inference from “(0 is even) to (Ex)*(x is even).

Such as

inference is not valid for all numerical terms, however.
Suppose,

for example, that there is a non-constructive proof

that there are numbers with the property

P.

Assume also that

this non-constructive proof is the only means we have of

knowing that there are such numbers.

In particular, we know

of no examples of numbers which have

troduce

a

property

P'

as an abbreviation for

P.

Then we could in-

'the least number with

Then we would have * Pa but not (Ex)*Px.

.

we replaced

a'

with

'O'

If

however, the inference would be

valid.

Thus we might attempt another reconstruction of

Benacerraf

'

s

argument

(6)

S(0)—> (Ex)*(Sx & x=0)

(7)

-

(Ex) *(Sx & x=0)

The conclusion of course is

(3)

(6)

again appears to be

a reasonable rendering of the principle Benacerraf states.

Does the evidence ((4)) Benacerraf presents show that (7)
is true?

Yes,
(8)

for assume (7) is false.

(Ex) *(Sx & x=0)

Now given the interpretation of
be true is if
(9)

That is, assume

'

*(Sa & a=0)

'*'

the only way for (8) to
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is true for some substitution of a constant for
a.

But the

only substitutions for a which yield the truth of '*Sa' are

precisely those substitutions which do not according to
yield the truth of ’*(a=0)'.
a and so

(7)

(4)

Thus (9) is false for every

is true.

In fact,

Benacerraf's argument can be simplified

here, for by an easy argument (6) implies
(10)

S(0)

*S(0)

and in arguing that (9) is false, we have established
(11)

-*S(0)

Thus in its simplest form, Benacerraf's argument can
be seen as proceeding from (10) and (11) to (3).

A slightly

more complicated version which is closer to the text proceeds
from (6) and

(7)

to

(3).

Note also that in accordance with

Benacerraf's intentions both of these arguments are easily

generalized to show that no number is a set.
Before turning to a consideration of whether

(6)

and (1) are plausible, let us see how Benacerraf "extends"
his argument to show that there are no numbers.

Benacerraf

says
I therefore argue, extending the argument that
led to the conclusion that numbers could not be
sets, that numbers could not be objects at all;
for there is no more reason to identify any individual number with any one particular object
than with any other (not already known to be a
number) ( [2 ]
69)
:

How is this argument being extended?

Consider the

simple ((10) and (11)) version of his argument that

0

is
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not a set.

The natural way of extending this
argument is
to say that if 0 is anything
at all, then there is something

which is such that it can be shown to
be
(12)

(Ex) (x=0)

-a>

0

.

More formally,

(Ex)*(x=0)

Benacerraf then might claim
(13)

-

(Ex)*(x=0)

The immediate problem here is that
Benacerraf has no inde-

pendent way to show that the rather
implausible (13) is true.
Thus far, however, we have ignored the
parenthetical

comment which closed the last quotation.

This comment sug-

gests that Benacerraf wants to strengthen
the consequent
of (12) in some way.
Perhaps his claim
is

(14)

’

(Ex) (x=0)

(Ex)*(Px & x=0)

is true for some replacement of

1

P

’

by a predicate which

does not already identify x as a number."

Now this con-

dition

could perhaps be stated as requiring that such a
predicate P be such that 'for all x, if x is P, then
’

is a number'

x

'

is not analytic.

ial counterexamples,

require that

(e.g.

for all x,

'

But in order to block triv-

self-identify

:

if x is a number,

)

we should also

then x is

P'

also not be analytic.
First of all,

it is easy to be puzzled why Benacerraf

would call (14) an extension of either

(6)

if Benecerraf wants to argue from (14) and
(15)

'

-

(Ex)*(Px & x=0)

or (10).

In fact,
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is true for every

(16)

'P'

which meets his condition, to

(Ex) (x=0)

-

his earlier argument actually leads us to doubt
his claim
(15).

Having already shown (3), he has established
(17)

meets his condition since 'all non-sets are numbers'

-S
j-S

*-S(0)

false and since 'all numbers are non-sets' though true

according to Benacerraf

with

’'(0=0)

is not analytic.

Thus

together

(17)

which is plausible and which is not something

Benacerraf can assume is false implies
(18)

*(-S(0) & 0=0)

which is a counterexample to (15).

Thus,

so far from this,

second argument being an extension of his first argument,
the first argument actually undercuts the second.

Perhaps, however, it is not (14) which Benacerraf

means to defend.

Perhaps, he means to defend the stronger

claim
(19)
is

'

(Ex) (x=0)

(Ex) *( (y) (Pyf-> y=x)

& x=0)

true for some substitution of a predicate for

meets, "his condition.

The point of (19)

is

P
'

that if

'

0

'

which
exists

it can be uniquely picked out in some way which does not

already identify it as a number.
of course,

His further claim then,

is that the consequent of

(19)

is

not true for

any predicate which meets his condition.
Once again it is difficult to see that the
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considerations which might motivate acceptance
of (6) or
(10) also would motivate acceptance of
(19)
Benacerraf
does not explain.
In any case, it is doubtful
.

that he can

show that the consequent of (19) is
false for any. predicate
which meets his condition.
Consider 'is thought about by
0
Tom
'is named by
'is proved by Tom to have some
'

'

,

'

property', and 'is a counterexample to the
claim that all
universities have more than two students and
all even numbers are greater than 1'.
Each of these predicates meets
his condition and substituting any of them
p
for

'

'

in

(19)

could under the appropriate conditions make
the consequent
of (19) true.

I

think then that we must conclude that at

least in this form, Benacerraf

argument for (16) is a

s

failure
Let us now consider (6) and (10)

accepted

(7)

and (11), if either

(6)

.

Since we have

or (10) is reasonable

to believe Benacerraf would have a convincing
argument that
0

is not a set.

First of all, what does Benacerraf say in

favor of these premises?
have rendered as

(6)

He says that in saying what we

and (10),

I am no l committing myself to the decidability
by
proof of every mathematical question--for I consider this neither a mathematical question nor
one amenable to proof.
In awaiting enlightenment on the true identity of 3 we are not awaiting
a proof of some deep theorem.
Having gotten as
far as we Iqave without settling the identity of
3,
we can go no further.
We do not know what a proof
of, that coul d look like.
The notion of "correct
account" is Freaking loose from its moorings if we
admit of the possible existence of unjustifiable
but correct answers to questions such as this ([2]: 58).
.

.
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This is not very helpful.
it be showable that it is a set?
is that he does not defend

(6)

If 0 is a set why should

All that Benacerraf says

or (10) because he defends a

general principle that every truth can
be shown to be true.
He does nothing to explain why this
principle though not
plausible
general is plausible in this particular
case.
Would he also want to say that if a
proposition is a state

m

of affairs, it must be showable that it
is or that if a mental state of affairs is a physical
state of affairs, it must
be showable that it is?
It would have been helpful if

Benacerraf had answered such questions.
Perhaps we can gain some insight into the
plausibility
of (10)

(and thus

by considering the following closely-

(6))

related principle.

Let

'S'

abbreviate 'is a non-set'.

Consider
(20)

(20)

S(0)

*g(0)

just says that if

that it is a non-set.

interesting.

0

is a non-set,

then it can be shown

The relation of (20) to (10) is quite

First of all, although in the absence of a

clear justification of these principles, it is difficult
to
be certain about this,
if

(20)

is.

same level.

it appears as though

The two principles are,

(10)

so to speak,

is plausible

on the

It is (rather difficult to imagine a justifi-

cation of either of these principles which
would not also be
a

justification of the other.
(

21 )

-*S (0)

But now consider.
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This is just as plausible as (11)
So we have

67).

([2]:

Benacerraf agrees

.

-S(0)

(22)

But then we have an interesting argument
(Ex) (x=0)

(23)

—

(S(0) v

-S

(0)

)

.

Difficulties might arise for (23) if

'is

a set'

has

in English a limited range of significance so
that, perhaps,

'Nixon is a set' has
is a non-set

truth value gap.

If this is so,

then

has two possible readings depending on whether

things which fall out of the range of significance of 'is
a
set

satisfy

is a non-set'

so that whether or not

significance,
(23)

is

(23)

I

.

intend the broader reading

is a set'

has a limited range of

true.

together with

(3)

and (22) implies (16).

In

other words, Benacerraf can argue from (10) and (20) to the

conclusion that
tension
that

0

0

Even though his own "ex-

of the argument that 0 is not a set does not show

does not exist, here is another extension (which

in a clear way

is_

seem to show that
if (10)

does not exist.

an extension) of that argument which does
0

does not exist.

That is,

it shows it

and (20) are reasonable to believe.

Unfortunately,
plausible.

Let

'q.'

that Nixon exists.

(10)

and (20) are too strong to be

be the name of,

say,

the proposition

Then we can construct an argument exactly

parallel to that which we have just constructed.
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—»

(24)

S(a)

(25)

6(a) —=» *S(a)

(26)

-*S(a)

(27)

-*S(a)

(28)

(Ex) (x=a)

(29)

-

*S_(a)

—

> (S

(a)

v-S(a))

(Ex) (x=a)

Each of the premises of this argument is just as

plausible as the principles from which they are obtained
by replacing
'a'

with

'O'

'a'.

Furthermore, we could replace

with any other name of a necessary existent (except the

standard name of set) and the resulting premises would be

equally plausible.
we replace
'6'

'a'

And as for standard names of sets, if

by such a name and

by 'is a number' and

'S'

by 'is a non-number', once again the resulting premises

are plausible.

(I do

not think that

'a'

could be replaced

by a name of a contingently existing being if
set'

i.e.

a set

'S'

means 'pure

which does not contain any non-sets in its

transitive closure, for any such thing is
it,

-

a

non-set because

unlike a pure set, does not necessarily exist.)

In

other words, using the same sort of argument Benacerraf
uses to show that

0

is not a set,

it can be shown that there

are no beings which exist necessarily.
I

plausible.

think this shows that (10) is too strong to be
Let me summarize.

Benacerraf has not explained

why (10) is plausible, but it appears clear that (10)

is
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plausible if (20)

,

(24)

and an infinite number of other

principles are plausible.

If we assume (10) and hence the

other principles patterned after it, we can show that there
are no beings which exist necessarily.

But that such a

strong conslusion could be obtained from assuming (10) makes
it seem highly implausible.

Of course, Benacerraf would

answer this argument by showing that (10) unlike at least
some of the principles patterned after it is plausible, but

he certainly has not done that.

I

thus conclude that in

the absence of such a justification of (10)

rejected.

To put it succinctly,

,

it should be

given that the fact that

we cannot tell whether or not God is a set does not show
that God does not exist, so the fact that we cannot tell

whether or not

0

is a set does not show that 0 does not exist.

To apply this directly to (10)

,

given that the fact that

we cannot show that God is a non- set does not show God is
a set,

so the fact that we cannot show 0 is a set does not

show it is not a set.
I

believe then that Benacerraf'

s

argument that there

are no numbers which relies on the epistemological premises
(6)

and (10) is a failure.

In fact,

however, certain things

Benacerraf writes suggest that he not only had this episte-

mological argument in mind, but also another argument.
crucial passage

herie,

is

For arithmetical purposes the properties of numbers which do not stem from the relations they

The
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bear to one another in virtue of being
arranged
a progression are of no consequence
whatsoever^ But it would only be these
properties that
would single out a number as this object
or that.

m

Therefore numbers are not objects at
all, because
ln
v ^ ng the ^properties (that is, necessary
and
su -.§^
ticient) ot numbers you merely characterize
an abstract str ucture and the distinction
lies in
the fact that the "elements” of the
structure have
no properties other than those relating
other elements of the same structure them to
That
a system of objects exhibits the
structure of the
integers implies that the elements of that
svstem
have some properties not dependent on
structure
io be the number 3 is no more and
no less than to’
be preceded by 2
1 and possibly 0 and to be followed by 4, 5, and so forth.
([2]: 69-70).
.

.

.

,

The epistemological connotations of 'single
out'

suggest that in the first paragraph he is perhaps
appealing
to

If so,

(19).

the argument here is now familiar.

in the following paragraph (with one exception:

of the problem of "individuating" objects),

But

he speaks

there is no hint

that he is appealing to epistemological premises such
as
(6),

(10)

or (19).

In short,

it appears as though,

having

stated his epistemological argument, he then turns to ap-

proach the problem from a new point of view.

What then does

he argue here?

The claim is, roughly,

enough properties to exist.

that numbers do not have

This is, of course, what his

epistemological argument attempted to establish from the
premise that we cannot tell whether any number is a set.
Here, however,

the claim might be simply that for no number

x is being a set or being a non-set included among the
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properties of

x.

What is Benacerraf

'

s

argument for this?

Besides his epistemological argument, the only passage which
is relevant is the second paragraph of the above quotation.

Let us examine just what Benacerraf has said in the second

paragraph.

First, I will take a quite literal interpreta-

tion of this paragraph.

Then

I

will consider a weaker and

perhaps more charitable interpretation of it.
In giving the necessary and sufficient proper -

(i)

ties of numbers you merely characterize an abstract structure.

believe that we could replace 'abstract structure'

I

here by 'isomorphism type'.
example,

0

Then the claim is that, for

has only those properties which are had by every

thing which is the "0" of some structure which has the iso-

morphism type of the numbers.
But consider the property of being distinct from
Frege.

It is plausible to think that 0 has that property,

because

0

necessarily exists and Frege does not.

Further-

more, Frege is the "0" of a structure which has the iso-

morphism type of the numbers.
Note also that it is plausible to think that
has the property of being the predecessor of

only thing which has that property.
other than

0

1'

alone

It is the

Of course, things

satisfy the formal equivalent of

predecessor of

1.

0

'

is the

in some models of arithmetic, but this

does_ not show that these things have the property of being

the predecessor of

1.
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(li)

numbers only have properties relating
them

.The

to o ther numbers.

The example noted above is a counter-

example to this claim.

property

0

Being distinct from Frege is a

has which is not a property which relates

0

to

other numbers.
But furthermore since all the properties
relating

numbers to numbers are had, if at all, necessarily,
this
claim would imply that 3 does not have any
properties contingently.

3,

however, has the property of numbering the

books on my desk contingently.
(lii)

p r eceded by
3

is

2,

To be 3 is no more and no less than to be
1,

.

.

.

if Benacerraf is simply saying that
.

uniquely picked out by 'the successor of

saying anything that a platonist would deny.
saying that the only properties

3

2
'

he is not

If he is

has are those of being

the successor of 2, being the successor of the sucdessor

of

etc., his claim would seem to be refuted by the fact

1,

that

3

has the property of being prime.

Perhaps instead the claim is that if
P

then the proposition that

3

3

has a property

has P is entailed by the con-

junction of the propositions that
that

3

3

is the successor of 2,

is the successor the the successor of 1,

The

etc.

difficulty here is ^hat this conjunction would be necessarily
true and since no necessarily true proposition entails any

contingently true proposition, it would follow that
not have any properties contingently.

3

does

We have already seen
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that this is false.
We have reached this situation:

Benacerraf attempts

to argue,

roughly, that numbers do not have enough properties

to exist.

He attempts to show this by arguing that numbers

have only certain "structural" properties.

argued that this strong claim is false.

We have just

Thus, as far as he

develops it, this non-epistemological argument is a failure.
But,

of course, this strong claim could be false

while it is still true that numbers do not have enough
properties to exist.

(Perhaps,

in fact,

it was some such

weaker claim that Benacerraf meant to endorse.

What fol-

lows then may be understood as another interpretation of

the above quotation.)

In particular,

say,

is 0,

<t>

or not?

If one set theorist constructs arithmetic in such a way that
0

is

identified with

such a way that

0

(zS

and another constructs arithmetic in

is identified

with

{(6}

of them accepting a (harmless) falsehood?

is at least one
I

have no argu-

ment to show that the answer to this question should be,
No, but I do have an intuition that the answer is,

No.

This may be clearer in the case of ordered pairs.

Are ordered pairs sets?

The facts are that ordered pairs

can be "identified" with sets.
to me to be no further question:

Beyond that there seems
'

(a,

Id)

is

(a,

[<t>

b

}
}

is neither true nor false.
It should be clear that if there is anything to this

103

intuition,

it applies generally to mathematics.

are ordered pairs of natural numbers',

rationals',

'Rationals

'reals are sets of

'complex numbers are ordered pairs of reals',

'n-place relations are sets of ordered n-tuples' all are

neither true nor false.
In some cases I hope this will seem to be quite

clear:

'ordered pairs are sets' may be a case of this.

Furthermore,

if it is thought that one of these sentences

just listed is neither true nor false, then

I

think that

it should also be held that they all are neither true nor

false.

There does not appear to be any important differ-

ence between these examples.
One final point is this:

this intuition applies

not only to pure mathematical entities, but also to impure
ones,

e.g.

'(^Nixon,

Ford^> = {Nixon,

{$,

Ford}}'

is neither

true nor false.
In short,

I

have a certain intuition.

Benacerraf

apparently does, too, and he thought he could support this
intuition by two arguments, both of which
unsuccessful.

I

have argued are

have no arguments to replace his here

although a principle quite similar to (19)
in Chapter Six.

I

is

discussed

Simply relying on an intuition is a rather

weak position to be in, but

I

think that this position can

be strengthened by showing how a theory of mathematical

truth can be constructed which does accord with this
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intuition.

It is also interesting to see how a platonistic

theory of mathematics cannot account for this intuition.

According to the platonistic theory
in discussing,

both

'O'

I

am interested

and 0 have single referents and

there is a class which is the extension of 'is a set'
If so,

('S')

then both
(30)

0=0

(31)

S(0)

and

are either true or false.

According to my intuition, neither

of these sentences is either true or false.
Is there then a

modified platonistic position which

would accord with this intuition?

Consider (31)

.

Intui-

tively, we could pin the truth- valuelessness of (31) on

either

'S'

tension or

or 'O'
'O'

Either

'S'

does not have a unique ex-

does not have a unique referent.

Similar

remarks apply to (30)
Thus far, however, the platonist does not appear to
be forced to pin the difficulty on

or to pin it on 'O'.

'S'

Whatever choice is made, however, forces certain other
choices.

For example, if we say

'S'

has a unique extension,

pinning the difficulty on 'O', then we will have to pin the

truth-valuelessness ofWS(<^0,

0^>)

'

on

’

,

0^'

,

rejecting a platonistic theory of ordered pairs.
choices, will also be forced.

thereby
Other
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The intuition

have, however, will not through

I

considerations like these force saying that
have a unique extension, that

referent, etc.

'S'

does not

does not have a unique

'O'

All that is forced is certain conditional

statements such as, if

'S'

has a unique extension, then

'O'

does not have a unique referent.
It is thus quite consistent with my intuition that
a platonistic theory of sets,

say,

is

true.

platonist who has my intuition could say
a unique referent,

but

'

cS

'

'O'

The modifieddoes not have

there are sets although

does;

there are no numbers

Although this position is consistent with my intuiit is ill-motivated.

tion,

What, besides a desire to pre-

serve some form of platonism would lead anyone to accept

such a modified view?

In the absence of some argument to

the contrary, it is reasonable to hold that if either
or

'

)

<j

'

'O'

lack unique referents then both of these terms do.

In short, anyone who accepts my intuition should also re-

ject the thesis that any mathematical term (predicate) has
a unique referent

(extension).

Such a person should reject

any form of platonism with respect to mathematical entities.
In short, my intuition is incompatible with a cer-

tain natural view of mathematical truth.
of another theory of mathematical truth,

response to this would be to say:
.

In the absence
the most reasonable

so much the worse for my
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intuition.

As we have seen already, however,

there are

theories of mathematical truth which are compatible with
this intuition.

If a combined arithmetic and set theory

is interpreted as either an IAIT or a IMAIT

,

then such sen-

tences as (30) and (31) can be allowed to be neither true

nor false.
This fact provides some support for this intuition,
but the light shines in the other direction, too.

preting mathematics as either an IAIT or

a

If inter-

IMAIT allows us

to account for an inLuition not to be accounted for in other

ways,

this provides some jusification for saying either that

informal mathematics is best represented as an IAIT or that
informal mathematics is best represented as an IMAIT.

These

considerations, however, are neutral between whether mathe-

matics is best represented as an IAIT or an IMAIT.
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CHAPTER

VI

It has often been thought that
platonism suffers

from epistemological problems:

we know certain mathematical
truths, but hew could we know such
truths given a platonistic
account of mathematical language? A
related question is,
if we cake platonism to be the
claim that mathematical cons cants refer to mathematical
entities, then how is it that
they do refer? This is the question
raised by Michael Jubien
in a recent paper [ 14 ]

Jubien approaches this problem by asking if
there
is a

satisfactory platonistic account of mathematical
truth.
He conceives of a platonistic account
of mathematical truth
as proceeding by first formalizing
the syntax of an informal

mathematical theory and then selecting

a model (whose domain
consists of pure abstract entities) of that
formal theory.
A sentence of the informal theory is said
to be

true if its

formalized counterpart is true in the selected
model.
Jubien aoes not claim that this

is the only way a
platonist could give a theory of mathematical truth,
blit

he does suggest that the difficulties
confronting the above

approach would affect any other "platonistic"
approach.
Jubien argues that this platonistic account breaks
down because we cannot select a model (whose
domain consists of pure abstract entities) to interpret
a formalized

mathematical theory.

Suppose,

for example,

that this theory
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has the constant 'O'

in its language.

Then,

model of this theory it is
necessary that 0
some pure abstract entity
as its denotation.
Now the obvious way of doing

to specify a

1

'

be assigned

this is to say:

'O'

denote zero.

(For the sake of clarity

let

"0"

use
always as a name of the formal
theory constant and "zero"
always as a name of the informal
theory constant.
I follow
a similar convention
with other number words.) Jubien
does
not deal with this directly,
but he does deal with a similar
obvious approach when he says
that if we were to assume from
the outset that there are,
say, sets, this would
I

be inap-

propriate because,

it is tantamount to the
assumption that

there is a satisfactory
platonistic account of mathematical
truth" ([14]: 2).

Apparently then the project which
Jubien presents
to the platonist is to select
a model without using
specifi
cally mathematical language in
the metalanguage to do
this.

Suppose then that the platonist
cannot do this.
What would this show? Jubien
concludes that a platonistic
account of mathematics cannot be
given from the fact that
the platonist cannot complete
this project.
But why should
it be supposed that evdnif
a platonistic account of
mathematics is true, that the platonist
should be able to give
such an account without using
mathematical language?

Jubien does not directly deal with
this question,
but at least the outlines of
the answer seem to be clear.
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He takes it to be an open question whether or not a plato-

nistic account of mathematics is true.

denotation for
"let

'O'

To assume that a

could be established simply by saying,

denote zero," is to assume that 'zero' has a

'O'

referent.

And that is essentially to assume that

nistic account of mathematics is true.

a plato-

The platonist who

takes this obvious approach would thus be question-begging.

Suppose then that there is no non-question-begging

way of selecting a model.
a

Jubien concludes from this that

platonistic account of mathematics

is

false.

Why does

the conclusion follow?

Jubien apparently is appealing to the premise that
if 'zero' has a referent,

then there is a non-question-

begging way of assigning a denotation to 'O'.
a

non-question-begging way of doing this

is-

To repeat,

to do it with-

out using mathematical language.

Why should we accept the premise that if 'zero' has
a referent,

then there is a non-question-begging way of

assigning a denotation to 'O'?
what beyond what Jubien says
is

,

Once again,

but

I

^furthermore

am going some

suggest that the reason

then someone must have

that if 'zero' has a referent,

fixed its reference.

I

,

any terms or predicates

used in such a reference-fixing must already (temporally)
have denotations.

Now perhaps 'zero' had its reference fixed as
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referring to the first natural number.
able provided

That would be accept-

first natural number' already (temporally)

had a denotation, but not every mathematical term or
predicate could have its denotation fixed by using mathematical
language.

The resultant circle would in this case be vicious

since the terms used in fixing a term's reference must
al-

ready (temporally) have denotations.
The premise which appears to be justified by this
line of reasoning is that if 'zero' has a referent,

then

there is non-question-begging way of assigning a denotation
to some mathematical term or predicate.

Jubien can then be

understood as arguing that there is no such way.
It might be objected to the above argument that it
is false that if

zero

has a referent,

have fixed its reference,

then someone must

since this seems to imply that

there was some one occasion on which 'zero'

(or some word

from which it has been derived) was introduced as a referring
expression.

This might seem to be excessively unrealistic.

Granted-

Let us not therefore read into the expres-

sion 'the reference of a was fixed' the implication that

there was some one occasion on which a was introduced as

having a specific referent.
thing,

Still,

if 'zero' refers to some-

it is because of some facts about the people who use

this word and it could not be that every mathematical term
or predicate had its reference fixed by using some other

Ill

mathematical term or predicate.

In other words,

some people

brought it about (perhaps not intentionally and perhaps not
at one specific time)

fact it does)

that 'zero' has a referent (if in

We can do the same thing (in an idealized

.

fashion) just as they did,

that is, without using some other

mathematical term or predicate in fixing the reference of
any such term or predicate.
if 'zero' has a referent,

Thus we have our conclusion:

then we can assign a denotation

to some mathematical term or predicate without using mathe-

matical language.
This has been said in clarification and support of

Jubien's approach.

He then proceeds by asking whether

'O'

is a term which can be assigned some pure abstract entity

as its denotation without using mathematical language.

says,

He

"at the outset there seem [to be] only two possible

ways [of doing this]:

by ostension and by (unique) descrip-

tion" ([14]: 3).
At this point we can give Jubien's argument very

quickly;

'O'

cannot be assigned a denotation by ostension

because only sensible things can be ostended and no pure abstract entity is sensible.

'O'

cannot be assigned a denota-

tion by unique description, because the only descriptions

which even appear to describe a pure abstract entity uniquely
all use mathematical language.

This argument can easily be generalized as Jubien
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does

:

no mathematical term or predicate can have its denota-

tion fixed by ostension and the only descriptions which even

appear to describe uniquely the denotation of any such term
or predicate all use mathematical language.

Thus,

no mathe-

matical term or predicate has a denotation.
This is Jubien's conclusion, but it appears that he

might have drawn a much stronger conclusion.

There are

some difficult issues here, but prima facie the same sort
of argument shows that

'property' 'state of affairs’

'proposition' all do not have denotations.

and

(A possible

difficulty here is that some people have claimed that we
can actually see properties such as redness,

so that such

properties are sensible.)
In particular, however,

in a later part of his paper,

Jubien assumes that although we cannot refer to pure sets,
we can refer to any non - empty set, provided that we can

refer to all of its members.

Jubien does not attempt to support this assumption.
Furthermore,

I

believe that it is unwarranted given his

argument that reference to pure sets and numbers is impossible,

since the same sort of argument can be used to show

that 'the empty set' does not have a referent.
a

That is, if

term which purports^to refer to a set all of whose members

are specifiable in fact has a referent, then some similar
term- can be assigned a denotation without using that sort of
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Such terms purport to refer to abstract entities.

language.

Therefore no such term can be assigned a denotation
extension.

by-

Finally, the only descriptions which appear to

describe the referent of such a term uniquely all use one
or more of those terms.

ferent

Therefore no such term has a re-

.

Finally, the restriction that any non - empt y set is

specifiable, provided its members are appears arbitrary.

Why not say that any set is specifiable provided its members
are?

If so,

then the empty set would be specifiable as

'the set containing no members'.

Thus, Jubien's argument

can be used to undercut his assumption and also the restriction on his assumption appears to be arbitrary.
Of course,

in Chapter Four it was argued that in

fact his approach does not require the assumption that any
sets can be objects of reference.

If that argument was un-

sound, however, we have now seen that if Jubien has under-

cut platonism, he has also provided grounds for rejecting
the assumption he makes in constructing his own theory of

mathematical truth.

Does his argument show that reference

to pure abstract entities is impossible?

There are some apparent counterexamples to the claim
that 'O'

cannot have( its reference fixed without using

mathematical language.
I

'The referent of .'zero''

and 'what

am now thinking about' both might uniquely describe some
1

pure abstract entity and neither use (though the first
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mentions) -any mathematic al language.
If we think of ourselves as attempting to
recreate
(in an idealized fashion) how it was that

have a referent
of

zero

'zero'

came to

we cannot use the expression 'the referent

to do this for no such expression could have
been

used by anyone to pick out the referent of 'zero'
until
'zero'

already had

a

referent.

The case of 'what I am now

thinking about' seems to suffer from
I

similar fault.

a

am now thinking about' picks out something only if

picked out that thing sufficiently so that
beliefs about it.
that thing out,

I

what

1

I

have

can have de re

But then, however it was that

I

picked

could have used the same method directly

to fix the reference of 'O'.

by using

I

'what

Fixing the reference of

'O’

am now thinking about' thus only transfers

our problem to asking how it was that

I

am able to have de

re beliefs about that thing.

We have spoken of fixing the reference of
a

non-question-begging way.

'O'

in

By that we meant doing it

It is appropriate here to say why we do not discuss
Quine's approach in The Roots of Reference to carry out this
project of re-creation.
My reason for this is that as I read
"Ontological Relativity",
Quine thinks that there is no such
thing as reference.
The project which I take him to be pursuing in The Roots of Reference is that of explaining how,
for example
number words came to be used as if they re-'
f erred.
No reason is given for thinking that they do refer.
In fact, the picture Quine paints of how number words came
to be used as if they referred--essentially a series of
confusions, would, if anything, indicate that number words
do not refer.
t

,

,
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without using mathematical language.

The above remarks sug-

gest that we should expand this notion by requiring that we

fix the reference of

'O'

by not only not using mathematical

language, but also by not using semantical or intentional

Furthermore, for the reasons indicated in the

language.

preceding paragraph, the argument that if 'zero' has a
referent then

'O'

can be assigned a denotation in this way

goes through as before.
I

believe that it is clear that no mathematical term

or predicate can be assigned a denotation by unique descrip-

tion in a non-question-begging way.

If we consider the set

S

of mathematical terms and predicates, certain subsets of

S

are such that the denotation of every mathematical term

or predicate can be fixed in terms of the members of

but

S,

we cannot (without cheating by using semantical or intentional language) fix the denotation of any member of
out using some other member of

S

with-

S.

Further doubts about Jubien's argument might come
at two other points.

(a)

Is it true that we cannot assign

a denotation to any mathematical term by ostension?
it true that if we can assign a denotation to say,

Is

(b)

'O',

then

this must be done either by ostension or by unique descrip-

tion?
(a)

to

'O'

Jubien argues that if we can assign

by ostension,

a

denotation

then that denoted thing is sensible.

He is here thinking of what Quine calls direct ostension:
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the ostended thing is actually sensed or in some way in-

tuited ([26]: 39-40).
([20]:

81b-e,

([30]:

101),

85d-86b;

Now some platonists, e.g. Plato
73c-77b, 83b), Russell

[21]:

Godel ([9]: 271), have thought that at some

times we actually sense abstract entities.
nists,

For such plato-

direct ostension would be sufficient to assign a

denotation to mathematical terms or predicates.

As Jubien

points out, however, there seems to be no such sense

([14]

:

4)

In the absence of a much more adequate discussion of this

supposed sense, the view that we have such a sense is

unsatisfactory given the widespread belief that we have no
such sense.
Quine also discusses deferred ostension:

this is

the case where we point at something with the purpose of

Could we assign a denotation to

ostending something else.
'O'

(or some other numberal,

'O'

being, perhaps, an unfortu-

nate example) by deferred ostension?
I

am aware of no explicit attempt in the literature

to argue that this can be done.

(In fact, apart from the

just-mentioned theory of a special sense propounded by Plato,
Russell and Godel little has been said about how a denotation
could be assigned to, say,

'0'.)

such an attempt is Qudne

discussion of deferred ostension,

'

s

Perhaps the closest to

but this is undercut by Quine's general doubts as to whether
any term has a referent.
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The question
we,

so to speak,

I

wish to pursue here is whether if

subtract Quine's doubts about ostension

from his discussion of deferred ostension, we would have the
outlines of a theory according to which we could, say,

assign a denotation to

'O'

by deferred ostension.

What is involved in deferred ostension?
simple case.
and say,

Take a

You point at large footprints in the ground

"Bigfoot" meaning to introduce 'Bigfoot' as a

predicate true of the animals which make those sort of
prints.

(To make this as simple as possible,

assume there

are such animals.)

Under what conditions are you success-

ful in doing this?

You need to know some relationship which

holds between the prints and a Bigfoot

relation is:

.

In this case the

a Bigfoot makes these prints.

If you did

not know that that was the relation in question, you would
not successfully fix the extension of 'Bigfoot'.
Take another case:
of 'Leibniz'

for a friend.

Leibniz and say, "Leibniz".

you want to fix the reference
So you point at a picture of
In order for you to succeed,

your friend needs to know what the relation is between what

you point at and Leibniz.

In this case,

the relation is:

is a picture of.

These examples suggest the following necessary con-

dition for successfully fixing the reference of a constant
by deferred ostension.
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(C)

x fixes the reference of 'a' to be a by ostending b only if there is some relation R
such that R holds uniquely between a and tT
and x believes that R holds uniquely between
something and b.

The parallel principle for predicates is
(P)

x fixes the extension of P to be a set
by
ostending b only if there is a relation R~such
that R holds between S and b and x believes
that R holds between something and b.
'

'

These do seem to be necessary conditions of fixing
the reference of a term or predicate by deferred ostension.
In order to fix reference by deferred ostension,

I

need to

know what relation the referent-to-be bears to the directly
ostended thing.

In the case of (C)

to intend to let

'a'

R to
of

furthermore, x were

refer to the unique thing which bears

that would be sufficient for x to fix the reference

b,

to be a.

'a'

if,

the hard cases:

This makes it clear that (C) and (P) are
if (C) or (P)

could be satisfied in the

case of numbers, then in fact the denotation of some arith-

metical terms or predicates could be fixed by deferred ostension.

Thus, henceforth we will treat (C) and (P) as

not only necessary, but also sufficient conditions for fixing

reference by deferred ostension.
Consider now Quine's simple example of deferred os-

tension of linguistic types by direct ostension of tokens
of that type.

(For reasons to be noted later, this is a

simpler case than that of deferred ostension of numbers.)

Could

I

fix the reference of 'the type of 'a'' by ostending
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According to

'a'?

(

relation R such that

I

then there is a

if I can do this,

C)

believe truly that there is something

(which in fact is the type of 'a') which bears R uniquely
to

In this case it is clear that the relation in ques-

'a'.

tion is

is

:

the type of

.

Suppose (this is the crucial case as we have seen)
further that

do not as yet have in my vocabulary any

I

synonym of 'is the type of'.

I am,

to "break into" talk about types.

so to speak,

Could

I

just trying

then truly believe

that there is something which is the type of that token?

That appears to be the question, since it is to ask whether
I

could fix the reference of 'the type of ’a" by deferred

ostension without using talk about types.
I

'a

'

1

am arguing that if the reference of 'the type of

can be fixed by deferred ostension, then prior to using

type- language

I

would have to believe truly that there is

something which is the type of the token

'a'.

Such belief

would have to be language independent in the sense that
would have that belief at a time when

I

I

lacked the linguistic

means of expressing it.

Furthermore in an historically interesting sense,
this belief would be innate.

worth considering.

A modern philosopher would have said

believe that there is a thing that is the type

that if

I

of

then

'a'

This historical parallel is

I

have the concept or idea of being a type

.
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Furthermore

,

for the same reason that we have said that

the extension or

'number'

cannot be fixed by direct osten-

slon or fixed by unique description without using
mathematical language, a modern philosopher (who accepted our
rea-

soning) would have said that this concept of being
a type
is neither derived directly from experience,

nor is de-

finable in terms of concepts which are derived directly from
experience.

In short,

it is precisely the sort of concept

which Locke and Hume say we do not have and Descartes and
Leibniz say we do have.

It is an innate concept or idea.

This historical parallel can even be drawn further.

Leibniz says that although we do not derive the ideas of,
say, mathematics from the senses,

the senses provide the

occasion which allows us to bring them to mind
(

[33

!

41~3, 53-4)

Deferred ostension would seem to be a

.

clear case of this:

pointing at the token

'a'

brings to

mind the idea of the type of that token even though this
idea is not derived from the senses

(in the sense of being

derived directly from the senses or defined in terms of
such ideas)
To say then that we could believe truly that there
is a thing

which is the type of

'a'

even though we have no

type- language implies the interesting claims that (i) we can

have the belief that there is something which is the unique
type -of toke.n

'a'

at a time when we lack the linguistic

means of expressing that belief and (ii) we have what modern
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philosophers would have called the innate idea of a type.
(ii)

appears to be the more likely place to attack

and the empiricists, of course, had such an attack.

Jubien's argument that mathematical terms do not

short,

have

In

referents depends on familiar empiricist assumptions

in the sense that at least in outline the rationalists had

an answer to his argument and that the most likely answer
to the rationalists'

argument is an empiricistic theory of

the origin of our ideas.
To categorize his argument in this way is not, of

course,

to criticize it.

It is,

however,

to point out that

his argument is not "knock-down" in the sense that there
is no even slightly plausible reply to it.
a

There is such

reply and it can be adapted from the work of Descartes

and Leibniz.

In order to show that numerals

do not have

referents, he would have to show that the details of the

rationalists' theory could not be developed in a plausible
fashion.
Thus far only linguistic types have been discussed.

Let us briefly apply the above points to the case of natural
numbers.

In order to fix the reference of '2' by deferred

ostension we need doubly-deferred ostension.

(This is why

this case is more complicated than the case of linguistic

types.)

If we point at two apples and say "two" meaning

to fix the reference of '2',

this will be successful only

if two bears the relation of being the number of to
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something which we ostend.

But the thing to which two bears

this relation is not anything we can directly ostend; rather
it is a concept or a set.

Thus we can think of this process

as involving first direct ostension of the apples, which

brings about deferred ostension of a set or concept, which

finally brings about deferred ostension of two.
(b)

of 'O'

Is it true that if we can fix the reference

then this must be done either by ostension or unique

description?

If by 'ostension' we mean

direct ostension

,

then we have already discussed one possible alternative to
Let us consider another alternative.

this dichotomy.

The following are,

I

think,

familiar facts about

teaching, say, set theory to someone who has never heard
of set theory.

Such teaching often proceeds not by attempting

to ostend sets or by attempting to describe uniquely any

some
sets, but rather by simply introducing the learner to

elementary facts of set theory.

We say,

for example, that

there is a set which has as its only members Nixon and Ford;
and
that for any two sets there is a set which contains all
all
only the members of those sets; that if two sets have
the same members,

they are identical, etc.

the learner will stop and say,

At some point,

"Oh, now I get it."

This suggests that another way of fixing the reference
approof mathematical terms is simply to state some of the

priate theory.

Note that stating this theory in no way
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involves uniquely describing any mathematical entity without using mathematical terms.
is

,

The question to ask then

is it plausible to suppose that reference could be fixed

in this way?
I

am again inclined to think that there is at least

some historical precedent to suppose that it is plausible.
If we take the rationalist point of view that there are in-

nate ideas, then, as we have seen, we can regard the direct

ostension of a token as the trigger which brings to mind the
idea of a type.

Similarly, taking the same point of view,

we could regard description of some of the fundamental facts
of set theory as the trigger which brings to mind the idea

We have already seen that there is some corrobo-

of a set.

ration to this view in that we can get someone to have the
idea of a set simply by telling that person some set theory.

Having noted this, let us now return to the topic
of deferred ostension.

Dropping talk of innate ideas,

which may introduce unnecessary questions of historical
accuracy,

let us see exactly what is involved in our reply

to Jubien'

s

argument.

The claim is that we could fix the

reference of 'the type of 'a'' without using any type
language provided we could truly believe that there is a
type of the token

'a'

even though we cannot see types, nor

can we uniquely describe them without using type language.

The difficult point here is, could we have such a belief?

We have pointed out, first that Jubien does not argue that
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we could not have such a belief and
second that there is

historical precedent for supposing that
there are such beliefs
.

If we are to be driven in the direction
of holding

that there are such beliefs,

it

would be important to know

more about them.

What beliefs are of this kind? What more
can be said about the relationship between
these beliefs
and the experiences which are the occasion
of our bringing
them to mind? Before they have been brought
to mind, in
what sense do we have these beliefs or
the concepts which
are used in these beliefs?

am not sure, however, that we need be
pushed further
in the direction of developing this
rationalist theory.
I

Traditionally the argument which has been used in
favor of
saying that there are such innate concepts or
beliefs has
been an "how else" argument: we have these
concepts (beliefs),

they could not be derived from experience,
thus how

else could we have them unless they were innate.
.([20]:

81b-81e, 85d-86b [33]
;

41-7,

(See

63-4).)

In this case we have a double
application of the

”how else" argument.

It is argued that since,

say, Peano
arithmetic is true, how else could that be
unless numerals
have referents.
(See ([32]: 57).)
And, thus, since numerals
have referents, how else could that be
unless we have innate
ideas.
In earlier chapters we have seen,
however, two

different ways to block the first
application of the how
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else argument.

That is, we have shown that we can account

for mathematical truth without viewing,

numerals as

say,

names of pure abstract entities by construing mathematical
theories either as IAIT's or as IMAIT's.

Furthermore, when we undercut this how else argument,
I

think we also remove much of the motivation for accepting

the rationalists'

theory we have outlined.

I

think that the

simplicity of empiricist accounts of language and knowledge
are appealing and that one of the major appeals of ration-

alism is simply that it is felt that empiricism cannot
account for the facts.

If we can show (as

I

think we have)

that mathematical truth can be accounted for without positing

innate ideas of types, numbers,

sets,

etc.,

then that

severely undercuts the theory that there are such ideas
and, more importantly here,

it also strongly supports

viewing mathematics either as an IAIT or as an IMAIT
This line of thought would be undercut if we were

forced to recognize innate ideas to, say, account for
language acquisition.

That would open the way to sup-

posing that we have innate mathematical concepts.

My claim

here is simply that mathematics need not force us in this
direction.

Jubien apparently regards his argument as a knockdown argument against a platonistic theory which holds that

mathematical constants have referents.

I

think that enough
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has been said to show that this argument is not as strong

On the other hand,

as that.

the most likely platonistic

account of how mathematical constants do refer has little

motivation given that there are competing theories of
mathematical truth.
Questions have often been raised as to whether

platonistic theory of mathematical truth is possible.

a

non-

A

more subtle and equally important question has been raised
by Paul Benacerraf

:

even assuming that a non-platonistic

account of mathematical truth can be given, will this account carry over in such a way that we can still give this

account when we embed mathematical talk into other kinds of

theories ([1]).

We have seen in Chapters Three and Four

that not only can a non-platonistic account of mathematical

truth be given, this account does also carry over to mixed
theories.

These facts should undercut much of the doubt

as to the possibility of adequate non-platonistic theories

of mathematical truth.

The topic discussed here connects nicely with the

discussion of Chapter Five.

That discussion concerned the

truth value of such sentences as '0=0'.
that neither

'O'

nor

'

(6

'

Now if it is true

have referents, it is very natural

to expect that there might be perplexity as to the truth

value of such sentences.

In other words, we can view this

perplexity as some corroboration of the conclusion of Jubien's
argument that neither

'O'

nor

'

(6

'

have referents.
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It

would be helpful to summarize these considera-

tions
(1)

We have a weak argument against platonism
which, relies on the (unsupported) intuition
tnat 0 =<zS is neither true nor false.
'

(2)
)

We have a more persuasive, but still inconclusive, argument against platonism put forward by Jubien (which we have just discussed).

(3)

The most likely reply to Jubien' s argument
has
little motivation if there are non-platonistic
theories of mathematical truth.

(4)

The fact that there are perplexities over
0=0 might be expected if (and explained
by the hypothesis that) neither 'O' nor '0'
have referents

(5)

We have stated two theories of mathematical
truth which both allow 0 = 0 to be neither
true nor false and also do not construe 'O'
and 0 as having referents; furthermore
both of these accounts carry over to mixed
theories
'

*

^

'

'

(

6

Finally (and this is a point we have not
stressed before) both of these theories of
truth are simpler than the platonist's account in that on these two theories there is
no need to postulate a special kind of entity
(the mathematical entity) in order to account
for mathematical truth.

Alone these points are quite weak; together, however,
they form a fairly strong argument against platonism:

by

assuming platonism is false we can get the rewards of plato-

nism (an account of mathematical truth) while assuming a
simpler theory of reference, a simpler ontology and also

explaining racts for which platonims does not have satisfying
explanations
(5)

however,

indicates that we have an embarrassment
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of riches

m

that we have two theories
which are opposed to

the platonistic theory which construes
mathematical con-

stants as having referents.

Is there anything to choose

between interpreting, say, arithmetic as an
IAIT and interpreting it as an IMAIT?
The only significant difference between these
two

accounts which we have seen concerns ontological
commitments.
For example, arithmetic construed as an IAIT is
committed
to there being infinitely many things.

Furthermore, em-

bedding arithmetic (so interpreted) into a theory which
does
not have a commitment to there being abstract things
may
_

yield a theory which

is

committed to there being abstract

things

Now arithmetic is supposed to be not only true, but
necessarily true.

What reason is there to think that there

are (respectively, must be) infinitely many things?
as we maintain the view that numerals have referents,
is a

straightforward answer to this:

'

(Ex) (x=0)

'

So long

there

is true

(necessarily true); furthermore it says that zero exists,
so zero and all the other numbers do

(must) exist.

In other words so long as we hold a platonistic

view of mathematical language there is reason to believe
that there are (must be) infinitely many things--the in-

finitely many mathematical entities.

It is part of con-

struing arithmetic as an IAIT, however, that there are no
special mathematical entities.

That is, anything can be
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in the domain of an acceptable structure for arithmetic.

Thus, unless we can find some independent reason to think

that there are (must be) infinitely many things, construing

arithmetic as an IAIT will have the undesirable consequence
that there will be no reason to think that arithmetic is
Of course, when we turn to set

true (necessarily true).

theory, as was seen in Chapter
go up even farther.

3,

the ontological bill may

This seems to be a significant problem

for interpreting mathematical theories as IAIT's.

In the

absence of a reason for thinking that there are (must be)

infinitely many things,

I

suggest that we construe mathe-

matical theories as IMAIT's.
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